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Abstract: Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in 
the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and 
international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to 
this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment 
of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in 
successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory 
are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost 
certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The 
history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that 
didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question 
“why?” is the central concern of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Thomas Schelling is widely thought of, and was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as  
a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and 
international relations. Much of the popularity of his work and other analysis in this vein stemmed 
from the perception that it contributed to the development and application of new “tools” for 
understanding and analyzing social phenomena. Following the prize award, the economics journalist 
David Warsh described him as “the pioneering strategist who made game theory serve everyday 
economics for thirty years” [1, p. 7]. 
OPEN ACCESS 
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However, although Schelling makes frequent references in his writings to rational choice and game 
theory, his analysis of deterrence
1
 is based on assumptions about human behavior and logic which, 
although useful in thinking practically about strategic policy, are at variance with those commonly 
adduced by game theorists, at least those specializing in its non-cooperative variant.
2
 In areas 
especially relevant for strategy and conflict, game theory leads to behavioral predictions which are 
simply not borne out in the laboratory or, as will be apparent, in the real world. 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma played once, for example, the Nash prediction is unambiguous: no 
cooperation. Defection is the strictly dominant strategy. Experimental evidence, however, provides 
abundant evidence of positive rates of cooperation. Similar “anomalies” are found in voluntary contribution 
to public goods games (which are multi person Prisoner’s Dilemmas), where one sees positive contribution 
levels, in the trust game, where one sees positive transfers in both directions, and in many other instances.
3
 
Game theory has faced similar predictive failures in its treatment of behavior in the real world.  
As John von Neumann argued (citations follow), its canonical behavioral assumptions predicted 
devastating conflict between nuclear adversaries.
4
 This has not happened, and the nonoccurrence of the 
“most spectacular event of the last half century” was the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture [2, p. 1]. 
Schelling could refer to this as an event—something which has taken place—even though it had not—
because choice by self-regarding players predicted it so unambiguously. The reality, I will argue, is that 
because of the disjuncture between human behavior and the self-regarding assumptions often used in 
formal game theory, the latter offers little guidance, normatively or predictively, in thinking about 
behavior or strategy in a world of potential conflict.
5
 
                                                 
1 Deterrence most commonly brings to mind the prevention of attacks on one’s own territory or that of close allies. But it 
can, more aggressively, be used in furtherance of other foreign policy aims. Schelling was interested in both defensive 
deterrence and its more aggressive forms, and the role that nuclear arms might play in either. 
2 Non-cooperative theory studies interactions in which players are not allowed to make binding commitments among 
themselves. Cooperative theory allows such agreements, without specifying or exploring the behavioral attributes that 
might make them possible. 
3 See Kagel and Roth [3], Camerer [4] or Field, [5–8] for more discussion. In the trust game A can anonymously give B 
some or none of an initial stake, which is multiplied in value in the transfer. B then may, but is not obligated to return as 
much as she wants to A. If self-regarding players are rational, there are no transfers in either direction. 
4 One can object that the unitary actor assumption is simply inappropriate when thinking about interactions among states, 
although one can also object that the approach is inappropriate when applied to individuals (see Thaler and Shefrin [9]). 
Two points are indisputable: first, von Neumann argued (and believed) that superpower confrontation was a PD, and 
second, if that was indeed the game, it did not end with the Nash equilibrium. Von Neumann was a pioneer in 
developing game theory as well as nuclear weapons, and this has resulted in a tension which can be resolved in one of 
two ways. The first is to argue that nuclear confrontation was not a PD, in other words, that von Neumann did not know 
what he was talking about. The second approach, adopted here, is to accept the PD metaphorically as representative of 
superpower confrontation, but to argue that the behavioral assumptions that drove von Neumann’s (and many other’s) 
thinking were flawed. The central premise of this paper is that the reason we did not and have not experienced nuclear 
annihilation is that evolutionary history has endowed most humans with predispositions against playing defect in a PD 
that might well end up being played only once (Field [5,8,10]). People (and states) do indeed sometimes defect. But 
even when the logic of a strictly dominant strategy is fully understood, individuals frequently choose not to play it. 
5 Developers of formal theory have not been particularly concerned about this, placing more weight on logical 
consistency and theoretical novelty than on empirical validity. 
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Before considering in more detail Schelling’s evolving acknowledgements of the limitations of 
game theory in understanding deterrence, it is important to reflect on exactly why the theory is so 
barren in terms of its implications for policy or behavior. The main reason can be stated simply. So 
long as agents are self-regarding and there is some possibility of destroying an adversary’s offensive 
capability and/or its will to retaliate, von Neumann was right to characterize nuclear confrontation is  
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 6  And, because of the almost unimaginable destructive power of nuclear 
weapons, particularly thermonuclear weapons, it is a PD that will be played only once if the Nash 
equilibrium is realized on the first iteration.
7
 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma played once, defect (which in this instance means preventive war, 
preemption, or first strike) is the strictly dominant strategy for both players. As von Neumann argued, 
it is the only strategy a rational self-regarding player, assuming he is playing against a similar 
adversary, can choose. 
8
 But it is evidently not the strategy chosen by either the United States or the 
                                                 
6 A long tradition in the deterrence literature objects, and instead treats nuclear interaction as a game of chicken (see Zagare 
and Kilgour [11, p. 18]). Chicken involves A threatening to harm B in a way that will also damage A unless B backs off. 
The best response for either party is to back off in the face of a threat, but if both choose to escalate, the worst (least 
preferred) outcome ensues for both. Von Neumann did not see nuclear interaction as a game of chicken. Words were 
cheap. He did not argue that we should try and intimidate the Soviets by threatening to attack. He argued for attacking, 
and for attacking now. Those who reason in this manner tend to downplay or dismiss fears of retaliation, since self-
regarding agents would never retaliate ex post (as opposed to threatening to do so ex ante, which would not be 
credible). A large literature attempts to solve this problem essentially by assuming it away [11, ch. 2]. 
7 Preempters like von Neumann saw the nuclear standoff as a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the strategy space was limited 
to “attack immediately” or “wait.” No truly self-regarding player, reasoned von Neumann, would ever wait. Doing so 
exposed the actor to avoidable risk and granted a benefit to the adversary (the continued option of preemptive strike). 
Wait turned the PD into a game of trust: the question then became whether the restraint would be reciprocated. Actual 
political actors, who are human, often do wait, and establish expectations of reciprocity through diplomacy or other 
means that sometimes are realized. Von Neumann had little interest in wasting time on the dynamics of deterrence, or 
why people might make transfers in trust games. His counsel was to launch now, and his argument is unassailable if 
parties are indeed entirely self-regarding. If one finds this conclusion unpalatable something has to give. This paper 
argues (and Schelling suggests the same), that deterrence worked and von Neumann’s predictions failed because 
humans are not entirely self-regarding (a position anathema to those who consider themselves hard-headed realists).  
If that is so, behavioral science will be messier than economists and game theorists might prefer, because the ways in 
which human predispositions differ from the self-regarding baseline are not deducible from a simple set of first 
principles. Ideally, the deviations represent empirically validated generalizations from experimental or observational 
data. That is one of the premises underlying the growing field of behavioral economics, and accepting it means that 
research methods cannot be limited to blackboard economics. 
8 Von Neumann assumed that a rational player was by definition self-regarding and he had little tolerance for those who 
might suggest otherwise. A more general framework for rational choice theory is this: individuals have stable and 
complete preferences, these preferences are transitive and independent of irrelevant alternatives, and individuals use all 
available information in choosing action that maximizes a utility function derivable from these preferences. To say that 
players are both rational and self-regarding is to restrict the range of allowable preferences, and in particular to require 
that people prefer more material goods to less, and life over death. Suicide bombers may be rational and self-interested, 
but they are not self-regarding. Neither are those who give all their money to charity because it gives them a warm 
glow. The more restrictions one places on preferences the more it becomes possible to test the theory against actual 
behavior. The most general version of rationality, the simple claim that people act in satisfaction of their desires, is 
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Soviet Union through the four decades of the Cold War. For both sides, defection was trumped by  
a policy of restraint on first strike coupled with the threat of limited or massive retaliation,
9
 and this 
was true throughout both the atomic and thermonuclear eras and in spite of substantial shifts over time 
in the strategic balance between the two adversaries. How and why did this happen, and why did it 
prevent nuclear war? 
From archival sources and interviews conducted by political scientists and historians we know  
a good deal about discussions that took place in the United States at the highest levels during the first 
two decades of the nuclear age, and we are learning more about similar debates that took place in the 
Soviet Union. In the U.S., the central disagreements were between those inclined toward preventive 
war/preemption/first strike and those recommending policies of deterrence or containment.
10
 Support 
for aggressive preemption was remarkably widespread. It was not limited to a “lunatic” fringe. To 
provide a compelling rationale for deterrence, one of the objectives of the work Schelling conducted  




Much of what Schelling had to say was based on introspection, casual empiricism, and common 
sense. To most citizens confronted with the realities of the conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R,  
a policy of engagement and non-aggressive deterrence seemed intuitively more reasonable than one of 
aggressive preemption.
12
 But nuclear strategists weren’t necessarily like “everyone else”: they prided 
themselves on asking tough questions, pushing logic to its limits, and, if necessary, thinking about the 
unthinkable.
13
 The problem faced by Schelling in trying to bolster the case for deterrence with game 
                                                                                                                                                                      
unscientific. It is unscientific because it is not possible to validate empirically: there are no observational or 
experimental data that could disprove it. 
9 The doctrines of Massive Retaliation and Mutual Assured Destruction differ principally in the proportionality of  
the response. 
10 These positions are not completely irreconcilable, because one can threaten a nuclear strike to pressure an adversary to 
do (or not do) something other than simply not launch a nuclear strike against one’s own territory. Indeed, the U.S. 
relied on such a threat to deter a Warsaw Pact conventional thrust into Western Europe, and some wanted to use the 
threat to force the Soviets to do other things, such as get out of East Germany, or abandon their atomic weapons. The 
most aggressive preemption—a surprise attack without prior threats or attempts at bargaining, is nevertheless hard to 
classify as deterrence. The difference between traditional and aggressive deterrence seems to be captured in the 
distinction between deterring from and forcing to, although to deter successfully may be to force another not to do 
something it wants to do—such as attack you. 
11 It would be a mistake, however, to think that Schelling, or any of the other strategists or defense intellectuals, adopted a 
totally consistent position. More often than not they were simply of two minds about a problem, or moved sequentially 
between positions as they struggled with conundrums that remain with us today. His writings, however, unlike those  
of Bernard Brodie or William Kaufman, had little direct influence on high level decision making during the  
Eisenhower administration. 
12 At the start of the Korean War, in July 1950, only 15 percent of the American public agreed that the United States 
should “declare war on Russia now.” In September 1954 a Gallup poll asked, “Some people say we should go to war 
against Russia now while we still have the advantage in atomic and hydrogen weapons. Do you agree or disagree?” 
Only 13 percent agreed. [12, p. 100]. 
13 The reference is to the title of a book published in 1962 by Herman Kahn [13]. 
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theory was that such theory, when coupled with the common assumptions that agents are both rational 
and self-regarding, provides stronger support for preemption or preventive war. 
No one understood this better, or articulated it more forcefully, than John von Neumann, coauthor 
of the book that helped launch the American intellectual romance with these methods [14]). Games 
and Economic Behavior didn’t discuss Prisoner’s Dilemmas, which hadn’t yet been formally 
characterized. But von Neumann followed the subsequent literature on non-zero sum games and the 
equilibrium concept for non-cooperative games developed by John Nash [15]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
is a classic venue for applying the Nash solution concept, yet the Nash equilibrium in the one shot PD 
has long troubled economists because it is so clearly inefficient. 
In the PD, you have two plays: you can cooperate or defect. Against the play of cooperate, defect is 
the superior strategy, and against the play of defect, defect is the superior strategy. Both parties would 
be better off if they both cooperated, but the logic of strict dominance is unassailable. If the players are 
rational and self-regarding, we will be hard pressed to explain why such a decision maker should play 
a strictly dominated strategy. 
Von Neumann believed that inasmuch as the US-Soviet standoff was a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and 
inasmuch as both actors were rational and self-regarding, the only defensible policy was immediate 
attack [12, p. 100]; [16]. Since there was some chance of destroying an adversary’s offensive 
capability and/or will to retaliate by attacking, the best course of action was to launch now. Many 
others argued in a similar fashion. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained in 1947, “Offense, 
recognized in the past as the best means of defense, in atomic warfare will be the only general means 
of defense” [17, p. 77]. 
One reason the Cold War remained cold was that proponents of preventive or preemptive nuclear 
war lost arguments in the late 1940s, throughout the1950s, and again at the time of the Berlin Crisis in 
1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 
By the end of the 1960s, most of the dilemmas of the nuclear age remained and if anything had 
intensified, but key analysts had begun to lose faith in the promise of game theory to illuminate them. 
The limitations of these methods in providing real guidance to problems of nuclear strategy had 
become obvious, and doubts could no longer be so easily papered over with optimistic claims that 
future theoretical progress would remedy these deficiencies [12, p. 261]. After the 1960s strategic 
studies were less likely to claim to be advancing game theory through the study of nuclear policy, or to 
be using such theory to untangle such operational challenges as target selection. 
The loss of faith in these methods did not mean, of course, that the conundrums vanished.
14
 The 
fundamental policy divide between those inclined to preemption and those inclined toward deterrence 
remains with us to this day. The world situation has changed since the 1950s, and especially since the 
early 1990s, with the breakup of the Soviet Union making it no longer as easy to identify adversaries 
or at least their location. But the heirs to von Neumann’s way of thinking continued periodically to 
occupy prominent positions in the executive branch of the United States Government.
15
 
                                                 
14 Nor did it mean that the elaboration of such models in academic communities ceased. 
15 Setting aside the novel problem of threats from non-state actors, the United States faced a replay of the arguments for 
preemption/first strike against the Soviet Union in the 1950s as it confronted the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran or 
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Advocates of preemption always come armed with strong rhetorical advantages. It is a tough 
minded policy that can appeal to considerations of both opportunism and prudence. To advocate a 
policy of preemption is to ground policy in the inexorable logic of strict dominance.
16
 Rational,  
self-regarding agents must play a strictly dominant strategy, or, by definition, they are not rational. 
The strength of the case for first strike, surprisingly, is, for proponents, not much affected by the 
military balance between the two adversaries. If a nation is stronger, the argument goes, it must strike 
first to crush the will, damage command and control, and eliminate as much of the retaliatory capacity 
of the adversary as it can. And if it is weaker, it must strike first, to benefit from the element of 
surprise, to use one’s assets before they are lost and, by destroying some of one’s adversary’s offensive 
capability, mitigate the damage from the almost certain incoming salvo. Why almost certain? Because 
one’s adversary will have made the same calculations, and, whether stronger or weaker, also have 
concluded that striking first is best. It is a mistake to believe that altering the military balance in either 
direction will necessarily weaken the calls for preemption from those who favor it. 
To advocate a policy of nonaggressive deterrence, in contrast, is to premise policy on human 
behavior that can be neither recommended nor expected in a world assumed populated by rational  
self-regarding agents. Deterrence works when both parties play strategies that cannot be defended as 
strictly rational for self-regarding players, and make inferences that their adversary is not entirely 
rational or self-regarding. One cannot get beyond von Neumann’s case for preemptive war other than 
by acknowledging this. Advocates of deterrence can, however, point to the principal defect of an 
aggressive policy of preemption, and it is not a trivial one. As a practical and moral matter, it leads in a 
conflict between nuclear adversaries more or less directly and more or less certainly to the deaths of 
hundreds of millions of people.
17
 
Von Neumann understood that if one wanted to provide a prescriptive justification for first strike, 
assuming parties are self-regarding, game theory was very effective. Or, if one wanted descriptively to 
explain why the world had been destroyed in a nuclear conflagration, game theory worked well. 
Outside of the classroom and world of working papers, in other words, theory could easily succeed at 
justifying policies that weren’t pursued and explaining events that didn’t happen. If one wants,  
in contrast, to justify a policy of deterrence and containment, explain descriptively why a balance of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
North Korea, or an unfriendly but nuclear armed Pakistan. And simmering dissension continued after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union over whether it was prudent to consider nuclear armed Russia as our friend. 
16 A strictly dominant strategy is a strategy that provides a superior payoff, irrespective of the strategy selected by one’s 
counterpart. In the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, defect is the superior strategy whether one’s counterparty cooperates 
or defects. 
17 This, however, has never been a compelling argument for committed advocates of preemption, since victory is defined 
as retaining a higher fraction of the surviving population, territory, or economic assets. Obviously, if a country were 
able to obtain what it wanted from an adversary merely by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, it could be to that 
country’s advantage to do so. But in order for threats to be credible, one must actually be prepared to follow through on 
them. In the age of conventional war, the victor could often be better off in spite of the costs of fighting. The problem 
for those pushing the conventionalization of nuclear weaponry, and the idea that one could fight and win a nuclear war, 
was that by most reasonable standards, this cannot be the case in a nuclear war. As Eisenhower put it, “even assuming 
that we could emerge from a global war as the acknowledged victor, there would be a destruction in the country (such) 
that there would be no possibility of our exercising a representative form of government for at least two decades at the 
minimum” (cited in Jervis [18, p. 62]). 
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terror kept the peace for forty years during the Cold War, or provide guidance as to what one should do 
if one does not strike first, formal theory premised on rational choice by self-regarding agents turned 
out to be of relatively little help. 
In the academic and policy worlds, however, those who could claim that they were using game 
theory to understand real world problems and to provide guidance on how to resolve them enjoyed a 
premium in the form of career advancement and honorifics. This is a sensitive issue but I think most 
will agree that it is a fact of intellectual politics that has been true for half a century and remains so 
today. What then was Schelling’s attitude toward formal or pure game theory? 
Circa 1960, it can best be described as inconsistent. In the preface to The Strategy of Conflict he 
suggested that he was advancing game theory but later in the book gave mixed signals as to whether he 
believed such theory, at least at its then current stage of development, could provide practical guidance 
in matters of nuclear strategy or behavior. The Nobel citation in 2005 nevertheless awarded the prize 
to Robert Aumann and Schelling for contributions that the committee believed each of them had made 
to both theory and applications: 
The work of two researchers, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling, was essential in 
developing non-cooperative game theory further and bringing it to bear on major questions in 
the social sciences. Approaching the subject from different angles—Aumann from mathematics 
and Schelling from economics—they both perceived that the game-theoretic perspective had the 
potential to reshape the analysis of human interaction. Perhaps most importantly, Schelling 
showed that many familiar social interactions could be viewed as non-cooperative games that 
involve both common and conflicting interests, and Aumann demonstrated that long-run social 
interaction could be comprehensively analyzed using formal non-cooperative game theory. 
…Eventually, and especially over the last twenty-five years, game theory has become a 
universally accepted tool and language in economics and in many areas of the other social 
sciences. Current economic analysis of conflict and cooperation builds almost uniformly on the 
foundations laid by Aumann and Schelling [19]. 
Much of this was, perhaps by necessity, an exaggeration. Yet it was not entirely accidental that the 
Nobel committee would suggest, in the press release announcing the prize, and the prize citation, that 
Schelling, in his 1960 book, “set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social 
sciences.” It is an interpretation that Schelling invited. In the preface to The Strategy of Conflict,  
he advertised the work as “a mixture of “pure” and “applied” research” [20], strictly situating it within 
the theory of games [20, p. v, his italics] and in the text made repeated efforts to incorporate the 
apparatus of game theory as it was then developed, including extensive discussion and matrix 
presentations of two person games in normal form. 
Schelling’s contributions to formal theory are not in the same category as those of John Nash or 
Reinhard Selten [21]. I don’t mean that they are necessarily less or more valuable, simply that they are 
not in the same category. As Anatol Rapoport, one of the reviewers of Schelling [20] put it, 
Dr. Schelling’s book is … not therefore (to) be judged as a contribution to game theory, as a 
game theorist understands it, but as a contribution to the problem of linking game-theoretical 
Games 2014, 5 60 
 
 
concepts with other concepts in order to make possible more determinate normative 
recommendations to the decision maker… [22, p. 434]. 
There is little in The Strategy of Conflict that can be considered an advance in formal theory, and in 
later decades, Schelling didn’t claim otherwise.18 If, objectively, Schelling did not advance theory,  
his work nevertheless succeeded in creating an impression in the minds of many non-technical 
readers—and apparently the Nobel committee—that he had. That he did not push theoretical frontiers 
should not necessarily be seen as a criticism, since, even after another half century of development, formal 
theory provides limited insight into the types of problems with which he was most concerned (Walt [23]). 
By 1960 Schelling had read Luce and Raiffa [24] in great detail [20, p. vi] and knew that the 
analytic methods they described were of limited prescriptive or descriptive value in studying the 
problems with which he (Schelling) was concerned. His acknowledgement of these limitations is to be 
found partly in Chapter 1, where he allows that models based on the assumption of rational (which he 
implicitly assumes to mean self-regarding) behavior may be a “caricature” of actual behavior [20, p. 
5], but more extensively in Chapter 6: 
… some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. This is not to 
say just that it is an empirical question how people do actually perform in mixed-motive games, 
especially games too complicated for intellectual mastery. It is a stronger statement: that the 
principles relevant to successful play, the strategic principles, the propositions of a normative 
theory, cannot be derived by purely analytical means from a priori considerations … There is 
consequently no way that an analyst can reproduce the whole decision process either 
introspectively or by an axiomatic method. There is no way to build a model … with the behavior 
and expectations of those decision units being derived by purely formal deduction …  
It is an empirical question whether rational players, either jointly or individually, can actually 
do better than a purely formal game theory predicts and should consequently ignore the 
strategic principles produced by such a theory [20, pp. 163–164]. 
In this and nearby passages, Schelling presages discussions of cognitive modularity (see Barkow  
et al., [25]), work on dual selves (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, [9]), and, more generally, the subfield that 
has come to be known as behavioral economics.
19
 And he suggested explicitly that experimental work 
was strongly needed to mitigate the deficiencies of pure theory: “It does appear that game theory is 
badly underdeveloped from the experimental side” [20, p. 165]). 
An important question is whether subsequent experimental research mitigates the deficiencies of 
formal theory or simply ends up casting them in a harsher light. Clearly, at the time Schelling wrote 
The Strategy of Conflict, he hoped for the former. He held out the promise of advancing theory so that 
it could be more useful, writing for example, that “in international strategy the promise of game theory 
is so far unfulfilled…” [20, p. 10]), suggesting that it would be or could be fulfilled. 
Here in clear focus is the conflict between Schelling’s ambivalent aspiration to recognition as  
a theorist, and the acknowledgement that theory, uninformed by behavioral research, and largely 
                                                 
18 As he said retrospectively regarding his 1960 book, “I don’t think I had any noticeable influence on game theorists, but 
I did reach sociologists, political scientists, and some economists” [26]. 
19 “But in the mixed motive game, two or more centers of consciousness are dependent on each other in an essential way” [20]. 
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unconcerned with empirical validation, could not provide the foundation for a science of deterrence. 
On the one hand the advertisement of the book as a work in both pure and applied research, on the 
other hand the Chapter 6 recognition of the absolute limits of introspection or axiomatic methods.  
On the one hand, the acknowledgements that the promise of game theory in this arena was unfulfilled, 
on the other hand the apparent optimism that it was so far unfulfilled. 
If one accepts the logic of Schelling’s comments in Chapter 6, that one can’t reproduce the whole 
decision process introspectively or through an axiomatic method, that behavior and expectations  
can’t be derived by formal deduction alone, then any hope for advancing a science of deterrence must 
rest on data: experimental, observational, historical. A science of deterrence had (and has) to be 
behavioral, i.e., it has to rest on observations of human behavior. 
But if progress had to come from the empirical/behavioral side, then Schelling’s efforts to push 
forward theory were investments likely to have low yields in terms of advancing a prescriptive or 
descriptive science. He acknowledged this (i.e., in Chapter 6) although, as we have seen, not strongly 
enough or consistently enough to pose obstacles to the Nobel committee’s suggestion that he had 
“develop(ed) non-cooperative theory further” and award a prize based not only on advances in theory 
but also on its applications to “familiar social interactions”. 
2. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy in the 1950s 
If we accept Rapoport’s judgment that The Strategy of Conflict made little or no contribution to 
formal game theory, we can ask a related question: what influence did Schelling’s work have on the 
practical design of nuclear strategy? His writings provided general intellectual support for deterrence 
as opposed to preemption, and ultimately to efforts at arms control. At the same time, his emphasis on the 
manipulation of risk and the prospect of threatening or fighting a limited nuclear war in pursuit of political 
or strategic objectives can be read as support for an aggressive version of deterrence—brinksmanship—and 
a potentially dangerous form of saber rattling.
20
 
That said, he does not in fact appear to have had a great deal of influence on the formation of 
military or strategic policy in the 1950s. Partly this is simply because his government service was 
mostly in Democratic administrations and that under Truman involved foreign international assistance, 
not nuclear policy. Even though Schelling is often included in a pantheon of defense intellectuals 
alongside individuals such as Bernard Brodie, William Kaufman, or Albert Wohlstetter [12, p. 3]), it is 
actually rather hard to identify his footprints in the history of strategic debates in the 1950s at RAND 
or elsewhere.
21
 To appreciate this we need to delve more deeply into the actual history of those debates. 
                                                 
20 There is little evidence that either the Soviets or the Americans ever took this counsel to heart: “Rather than being 
implacable, irrational, or manipulative, states appear to be cautious, flexible, and generally loath to take precipitous 
action during intense crises” (Zagare and Kilgour [11, p. 228; see also pp. 29–30]; and Zagare [27, p. 113]). 
21 Citation counts demonstrate that Schelling has had a strong influence on academic thinking about strategic policy, but 
that is not necessarily the same as having an influence on policy. In this limited influence, Schelling was not alone. 
Rosenberg describes the impact of strategic thinkers in these terms: “Although such conceptual work was important in 
shaping public perceptions, and occasionally influenced the thinking of high policymakers or strategic planners, it 
generally had little relevance in the 1945–1960 period to the pragmatic concerns of operational planners” [28, p. 10]. 
Games 2014, 5 62 
 
 
Proponents of first strike occupied far more than the political fringe, and it is clear that both 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower considered seriously the prospect of preventive war or a 
preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.
22
 Neither, however, was prepared to approve an 
unprovoked surprise nuclear attack against the USSR,
23
 and neither was enthusiastic about first use, 
except, in the case of Eisenhower, in the instance of an actual or imminent conventional attack by 
Warsaw Pact forces on Western Europe. Each, however, was ready to use nuclear weapons in 
retaliation for an attack on U.S. territory. U.S. policy was clarified in the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine 
(announced in January of 1954) of massive retaliation to either an attack on the United States or a 
conventional Soviet thrust into Western Europe (or possibly other provocations). 
The situation in Europe and particularly Berlin created the most practical and immediate concern. 
The U.S. lacked the conventional forces to thwart a conventional advance in these areas. Air Force war 
plans, reflecting the doctrine of massive retaliation, anticipated, as a retaliatory response, hitting the 
Soviets with everything the U.S. had, concentrating on cities. Although, in terms of military planning, 
Eisenhower was unenthusiastic about preemption except in the case of an imminent conventional 
attack across Europe, some within the Air Force and the strategic community continued to argue for 
dispensing with the requirement of a provocation, or maintained that the very fact that the Soviets had 
nuclear weapons should be considered provocation enough.
24
 The arrival on scene of the far more 
powerful thermonuclear weapons did not end support for preventive war, which was widespread 
among civilian and military elites in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
In 1946 Leslie Groves, the U.S. army officer responsible for shepherding the development of  
the atomic bomb at Los Alamos during the Second World War, wrote an influential memorandum 
stating that 
If we were ruthlessly realistic, we would not permit any foreign power with which we were not 
firmly allied, and in which we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess nuclear 
weapons. If such a country started to make nuclear weapons we would destroy its capacity to 
make them before it had progressed far enough to threaten us [12, p. 100]. 
                                                 
22 For the evidence, see Trachtenberg ([12, pp. 100–152]). 
23 This prospect was explicitly rejected in NSC-68, which defined U.S. strategic policy in the 1950s, even though the 
document deliberately exaggerated the Soviet threat (Rhodes [17, p. 106]). NSC-68 was approved by Truman in August 
of 1950 and declassified in 1977. Truman had of course given the go ahead for dropping two atomic bombs on Japan in 
1945. But it was not until 1948 that he allowed the military to proceed with plans for further use of atomic weapons, 
and he made it clear he was making no commitment that he would use them again. NSC-30, as cited in Jervis [18, p. 
24]. 
24 As Trachtenberg writes: “In the late 1940s, and well into the 1950s, the basic idea that the United States should not just 
sit back and allow a hostile power like the Soviet Union to acquire a massive nuclear arsenal—that a much more 
“active” and “positive” policy had to be seriously considered—was surprisingly widespread” [12, p. 100]. As 
Rosenberg reports, as early as 1947 “the final report of the JCS Evaluation Board on the Bikini tests had recommended 
that Congress be requested to redefine “acts of aggression” to include ‘the readying of atomic weapons against us’” [27, 
p. 17]. But, as the public opinion data indicate (see fn. 12), the American public was not enthusiastic about preventive 
war. As a general rule, humans seem much more prepared to initiate, justify, or approve of attack in the  
face of provocation than in its absence. Of course, if one can define the mere possession of offensive weapons as 
provocation, or the possibility that one might acquire such weapons as provocation, the distinction blurs. 
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Groves’ memorandum contained qualifiers about ruthlessness and reasonableness. Others dispensed 
with qualification, advancing proposals ranging from goal oriented saber rattling (threats) to massive 
surprise attack. In 1948, William Laurence, the New York Times’ science correspondent, recommended 
an ultimatum to the Soviets: shut down their atomic plants or the U.S. would launch an all-out nuclear 
war.
25
 Winston Churchill favored threatening the Soviets: get out of East Germany or the Western 
powers would destroy their atomic facilities. Leo Szilard pressed for preventive war against the 
Soviets, simply to wipe out their atomic capability, and at RAND, John Williams was a forceful 
advocate for similar action. The conservative political thinker (and former Trotskyite) James Burnham 
was as well. Most remarkably, so was Bertrand Russell, in an address at the New Commonwealth 
School in London on 20 November 1948. In August of 1950, Secretary of the Navy Francis Mathews 
gave a speech arguing memorably that the U.S. should become the first “aggressor for peace” [12, p. 
117]. Even George Kennan, though he did not endorse initiating nuclear hostilities, mused that a war 
the Soviet Union stumbled into, before they had a massive arsenal, might be the best solution for the U.S. 
[12, pp. 103–104]. 
In the spring of 1953, Eisenhower considered but ultimately rejected the recommendation of a high 
level study committee headed by retired Air Force General James Doolittle that the Soviet Union be 
given a two year ultimatum: come to terms or risk global nuclear war. An Air Force study in August 
1953 made a similar argument. In May 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff Advanced Study Group 
recommended that the U.S. consider “deliberately precipitating war with the Soviet Union in the near 
future”. Eisenhower would not go along with that, either, and in the fall of 1954, approved an updated 
National Security Paper which stated (as had NSC-68) that “the United States and its allies must reject 
the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war” [28, pp. 33–34]. What the 
declassification of archival information has underlined is not that the U.S. refrained from attacking the 
Soviet Union (we knew that), but rather how close the country came to doing otherwise, and how 
forcefully and persistently advocates of preemption pressed their case. 
After Dulles’s announcement of the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954, and after it was clear 
that Eisenhower would not (except in the case of a Warsaw Pact conventional offensive in Europe) 
approve a preemptive nuclear strike, advocacy of preemption or preventive war became somewhat less 
open, but enthusiasm for it remained very strong, particularly in the Air Force.
26
 The option of 
preemptive war was raised again by three members of the Gaither Committee in the fall of 1957 [28, p. 
47]; see also [17] (pp. 106–108). Nor did the consideration of attack die with transition to new political 
leadership. In the 1960s, Kennedy seriously contemplated a nuclear first strike against the Soviets at 
the time of the Berlin crisis in 1961, and he was strongly pressured to resort to nuclear weapons in the 
                                                 
25 Laurence was no ordinary journalist. Invited by Groves, he was the only reporter to witness the Trinity blast in New 
Mexico as well as the atomic bombing of Japan—he interviewed the pilots who flew the aircraft that dropped the bomb 
on Hiroshima and Laurence himself flew in an observation plane to witness the bombing of Nagasaki. 
26 Eisenhower was prepared to launch on warning either of a nuclear strike on the U.S. or a conventional attack on 
Europe. This can be viewed as preemptive, because attack would be initiated before bombs actually hit the US or 
Warsaw Pact tanks moved west, but not in the way advocates of preventive war meant it. The distinctions lie in whether 
the trigger was an immediately impending attack on the U.S. or key allies, the simple possession of nuclear weapons, or 
the mere possibility that they might be acquired. Prior to the introduction of ICBMs, anticipated warning times for an 
impending attack were days rather than minutes. 
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Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. From a military standpoint, the training requirements for a strike in the 




Nuclear weapons offered the prospect of a relatively cheap alternative to the conventional forces 
that would otherwise be required to repel a Warsaw Pact offensive westward across the European 
plain. The difficulty with this strategy was that the Soviets were capable (or at least the U.S. believed 
they were capable) of promising retaliation in kind. Because the prospect of flattened American cities 
as a result of retaliation might give American planners pause in the event of a Soviet offensive, U.S. 
defense intellectuals such as Bernard Brodie and William Kaufman argued early on that the threat to 
defend Europe in this way was not credible.
28
 
What were the alternatives? Giving NATO countries access to their own nuclear bombs was 
initially unpalatable to U.S. strategists, so critics of massive retaliation developed a competing  
doctrine—counterforce—emphasizing a different targeting strategy and more graduated escalation.29 
Counterforce entailed responding to a conventional incursion into Europe with a limited nuclear 
response against Russia: hitting airbases, silos, and military installations, but not cities. Perhaps the 
Soviets would respond against similar targets in the U.S. but, it was argued, they would see their 
interest in avoiding our cities since we had avoided theirs. We might then threaten to take out  




As an alternative to massive retaliation, the counterforce strategy met with initial resistance from 
the Air Force, where it was seen, essentially, as soft on Communism (and Communists). In June 1958 
Air Force chief Thomas White told an audience of national security specialists he was “disturbed” by 
the recent tendency “to consider seriously self-restraints in nuclear weapons planning in the face of 
sure knowledge that no such restraints will be applied by the enemy. Our preoccupation with niceties 
in nuclear warfare… would, I am sure, delight the Kremlin.” Two years later, however, he supported 
the strategy. As far as we can tell, this was not the consequence of anything anybody at RAND had 
written. Why the change? 
It had to do with the fact that the Navy’s Polaris program threatened the Air Force’s mission and 
budget. Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), first deployed in 1960, had the great merit  
of being largely invulnerable, but they lacked the explosive power and accuracy to be used in a 
counterforce strategy. All they could do well was hit cities [30, p. 244]. Counterforce preserved a role 
                                                 
27 The main difference was how much lead time the military might have in preparing an attack, which would affect how 
many weapons could be fired off. 
28 This reasoning was part of de Gaulle’s rationale for pursuing an independent French nuclear deterrent, targeted at 
Soviet cities. 
29 Today both France and Britain have independent nuclear forces, and as McNamara argued in his 1962 Ann Arbor 
speeches, such forces make it even less possible to contemplate fighting a limited nuclear war (see Jervis, [18, p. 102]). 
30 The ideas of controlled escalation, and competition in risk taking, with the corollary that nuclear conflict might be 
limited, are significant features of Schelling’s thinking, although they conflict potentially with the viability of a nuclear 
firebreak, a principle endorsed in Appendix A of The Strategy of Conflict and reaffirmed in the Nobel lecture. 
Moreover, whatever “rules” of limited warfare the Americans wished to play by, the Soviets always ridiculed the notion 
of using nuclear weapons for bargaining [29, p. 144]. 
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for the more accurate bombers and land based ICBMs
31
 that the Air Force controlled, and was thus a 
way to marginalize the Navy. 
The deterrent value of the Air Force’s land based deterrent had been questioned since the early 
1950s by Albert Wohlstetter and others because of its alleged vulnerability to preemptive attack by the 
Soviets, and there had been fierce debates about the merits of hardening the aircraft—putting them in 
underground hangers—vs. dispersing them or simply purchasing more of them to insure that a credible 
second strike force would survive. Curtis Lemay, head of the Strategic Air Command, brushed aside 
these concerns. He was confident that the then secret U2 overflights of the Soviet Union would, under 
any contingency, provide him sufficient warning to get his planes fueled, armed, and in the air. SLBMs 
promised to solve the vulnerability problem once and for all, but in doing so they threatened the Air 
Force mission and its budgets. 
As a consequence of Polaris, the counterforce approach, which the Air Force but not the Navy 
would be able to undertake (because of the lower explosive power and poorer accuracy of the Polaris 
warheads) now had more support within the Air Force. But it was still a hard sell within the Strategic 
Air Command. When in the winter of 1961 William Kaufman briefed Power, who had succeeded 
Curtis Lemay as head of SAC, Power angrily responded: “Why do you want to restrain ourselves? … 
The whole idea is to kill the bastards… Look, at the end of the war, if there are two Americans and one 
Russian, we win.” To which Kaufmann replied, “you’d better make sure they’re a man and a woman.” 
Power then reportedly walked out [17, p. 67]; [30, p. 246]. 
This heated exchange illustrates why the prospect of millions, perhaps tens of millions or hundreds 
of millions of deaths was, for proponents of preemption, not a compelling objection to first strike. 
Victory was understood, and continued to be understood, not in absolute but in relative terms:  
as retaining a higher fraction of surviving population or military/economic assets [18, pp. 59-61].
32
 
Faced with resistance in SAC, and lack of enthusiasm from Eisenhower, who feared, given the 
dynamics of what he would later call the military industrial complex, that moving to flexible response 
was an invitation to launching aggressive war, Air Force chief White ultimately gave a weak 
endorsement to the counterforce strategy. Early in the Kennedy administration, however, these ideas 
came into ascendance, along with the idea that conventional forces should be built up to avoid having 
to choose between the unpalatable consequences of responding to an attack with massive retaliation 
and the equally unpalatable alternative of doing nothing. But counterforce, which on the face of it 
seemed highly attractive to those appalled by the likely consequence of either first strike or massive 
retaliation, brought with it its own set of issues. 
                                                 
31 Technical change during the 1950s was making land and air based weapons smaller and more accurate. 
32 Carl Kaysen, in the 1961 first strike plan formulated at the height of the Berlin crisis, formalized this criterion 
somewhat less colloquially: “Accompanying these assumptions is the notion that prevailing in a general war means 
coming out relatively ahead of the enemy. As an example, if the US has lost 20% of its industrial capacity and 30% of 
its people, but the Sino-Soviet bloc has lost 40% of its industrial capacity and 60% of its people, then the US, somehow 
or other, has won the war” [31, p. 13]. 
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3. Targeting Coordination 
In the late 1940s the U.S. Navy actually condemned nuclear weapons as “immoral” [30, pp. 232-
233]. This changed when the service, along with the Army, had the opportunity to begin acquiring its 
own tactical nuclear weapons. By the end of the 1950s, with the multiplication of nuclear armaments 
under the control of three of the four armed services (only the Marines didn’t have them), the obvious 
need for more coordinated targeting generated pressure for a single integrated operational plan 
(SIOP).
33
 The SIOP for the fiscal year 1962 (effective 1 April 1961) that emerged from the 
Eisenhower administration and was inherited by President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense 
McNamara anticipated, as had earlier war plans, a massive preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet 




SIOP-62 represented the most aggressive posture advocates of first strike could obtain in the 
absence of a President willing to approve preemption (in cases other than an impending conventional 
attack across Europe). The overriding imperative in this plan was to provide a first strike capability in 
the event of conventional incursion in Europe, and to insure that a massive second strike capability 
would survive any attack by the Soviets on the U.S. and, in the event the U.S. was attacked, actually be 
used. Military planners saw plan rigidity as a merit, not a defect. SIOP-62 did provide a range of 
options in terms of how many missiles would be fired; this depended on the amount of advance 
warning or preparation time that the Air Force would be given. 
For all of the options, the intent was to kill as many Communists as possible as quickly as possible. 
With a one hour warning, the retaliatory plan anticipated firing the 1459 U.S. nuclear weapons kept on 
alert (these ranged from 10 kilotons to 23 megatons, for a total of 2.164 gigatons); conservative 
estimates were that 175 million Russians and Chinese would die. If the President gave the go ahead for 
a full preemptive strike (28 h advance notice required) all 3,423 weapons with a total of 7.847 gigatons 
would be launched, and 285 million Russians and Chinese would die. These casualty estimates did not 
include deaths in Eastern Europe or victims of fallout around the world, and they reckoned damage 
only from blast, neglecting destruction resulting from heat, fire, and radiation. A more comprehensive 
estimate placed likely casualties closer to 1 billion [17, p. 88]. The option for a full preemptive strike 
was labeled Plan 1-A, giving insight into the priorities of some of the war planners ([28, p. 6]; [30, pp. 
269–272]; [31]).35 Total American megatonnage reached its peak in 1960, although total number of 
warheads peaked in 1966 [17, pp. 89, 95]. 
                                                 
33 Each Air Force Command controlled the detailed plans for the use of its weapons, as did the Army and the Navy with 
its tactical weapons. With the Navy acquiring strategic weapons (Polaris), the situation was worsening, with little 
coordination and much duplication of targeting [30]. 
34 In an earlier briefing on SIOP-62, before Kennedy took over, David Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, asked 
SAC chief Power what would happen if the Chinese were not involved in the fighting. “Do we have any option so that 
we don’t have to hit China?” Power responded, “well, yeah, we could do that, but I hope nobody thinks of it because it 
would really screw up the plan” [30, p. 270]. 
35 Kaplan had access to critical documents related to SIOP before they were reclassified under the Reagan administration 
(some have since been declassified a second time). 
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SIOP-62 mirrored the inflexibility of strategy which had been a feature of its predecessors, the Joint 
Outline Emergency War Plan, which evolved in the 1950s into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 
the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, and the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, all of which were characterized 
by plans for massive retaliation or attack [28]. These plans had called for executing a massive 
retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of a “General War,” defined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities 
Plan as “an armed conflict in which Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. and those of the United States are 
overtly and directly engaged.” The Army tried in 1958 to have the following words added: “as 
principal protagonists with the national survival of both deemed at issue” but the Air Force succeeded 
in having the amendment nixed [30, p. 277]. As a practical matter, the battle between preempters and 
deterrers was to define how sensitive would be the trip wire that would trigger massive retaliation. 
Provocation would still be required for the U.S. to launch, but the trigger would not have to be very 
substantial—a shooting incident in Berlin would have been enough—and the plans were so inflexible 
that they were in essence a Doomsday machine. Defenders—and one could find some support for this 
view in Schelling—argued that it was this inflexibility that made it such an effective deterrent. 
McNamara and Kennedy initially wanted a wider range of options—the possibility of more flexible 
response. The successor operational plan, SIOP-63, reflected some degree of counterforce thinking.  
It divided Soviet targets into five separate categories, with the initial U.S. strike only on such strategic 
sites as air and missile bases and submarine pens. Under Eisenhower, the desideratum of inflexibility 
was reflected in the facts that Minutemen missiles had to be fired in groups of 50 or not at all and they 
were each rigidly preprogrammed to strike one target. The Air Force initially refused to reprogram its 
missiles to provide flexible targeting, acquiescing only after its funding had been cut for a month. 
McNamara’s deputy pointed out that if the military chiefs really believed in SIOP-62, there was little 
need for generals [30, pp. 280–281]. In some sense this was a rules vs. discretion battle; the generals 
worried that any flexibility weakened the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and possibly the resolve 
of civilian leaders to use them if necessary.
36
 
But as McNamara succeeded in replacing massive retaliation with somewhat more flexible response 
(although even the limited attack options in SIOP-63 involved massive megatonnage with huge 
civilian casualties from fallout), some of the defects of counterforce became more apparent. In August 
of 1960 the newly orbited KH-1 (Corona) satellites began generating photographs indicating that  
the missile gap, which Kennedy had successfully exploited in his Presidential campaign, like the 
previously touted bomber gap, was an illusion.
37
 Eisenhower had been right in denying the existence 
                                                 
36 The objection to flexibility is that it becomes an end in itself, a way of kicking the can down the road. With policy 
makers unable to decide in advance what they would do in various contingencies, the imperative became to preserve 
flexibility so that decision makers would be faced in the heat of crisis or battle with a choice among options they had 
not been able or willing to make with minds unpressured by immediate circumstance (see [18, p. 80]). The more 
flexible response is built into war plans, the greater the potential strain on communication and control, and the greater 
the likelihood that there will be no response, one reason the military tended to be averse to increased flexibility. 
37 The claim of a missile gap originated with the Gaither report in 1957, a panel set up by Eisenhower that included Paul 
Nitze, a Democrat, and as Richard Rhodes puts it, “went rogue” in terms of what Eisenhower had expected it to do. 
Nitze was in fact the main author of the report, according to McGeorge Bundy [17, pp. 106–108]. Rereading this history 
is a reminder that the manipulation of evidence that Iraq possessed WMDs in 2003 did not represent the first time U.S. 
intelligence estimates and have been influenced by political and bureaucratic imperatives. 
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of such a gap, at least in favor of the Soviets. In fact, as the satellite reconnaissance data revealed, the 
U.S. had a 10 to 1 advantage in ICBMs. The Soviet strategic forces were so small and disorganized 
that counterforce now began to look appealing as a first strike option that might succeed in wiping  
out or very significantly degrading the Soviet retaliatory capability. The September 1961 National 
Intelligence Estimate concluded that the Soviets had just four operational ICBMs. 
In 1961 Khrushchev was threatening a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and in August 
began to build the Berlin Wall. The American garrison in Berlin had enough food, fuel, and 
ammunition to survive without resupply for just 18 days. So, with very limited options if the Russians 
further tightened the screws in Berlin, Kennedy considered a preemptive nuclear attack on hardened 
Soviet missiles as an option. The plan, little known to this day, was developed by Carl Kaysen, who 
estimated that only five to thirteen million Americans might die [30, pp. 297–298]. The Soviet  
military capability would have been devastated, but they would still probably have been able to hit 
back at the United States with a few megatons, and “New York and Chicago, with their great 
concentrations of people, can be virtually wiped out by a small number of high yield weapons. In 
thermonuclear warfare,” Kaysen added, in case it was not apparent, “people are easy to kill” [31]. 
Counterforce, which had originally been proposed as a move away from the hair trigger (and 
possibly non-credible) policy of massive retaliation, now provided additional fuel for preempters as 
well as grounds for more nuclear weaponry: more powerful, more accurate, and more of them. If the 
Soviets were ahead of us, argued the Air Force, we needed more missiles and bombers to deal with  
our vulnerability. If they were behind us, as turned out to be the case, we needed more weapons to 
transform counterforce into a viable first strike capability and to stay ahead of them. 
However—as a practical matter—as the U.S. continued to become strategically stronger, it could be 
argued that a counterforce targeting strategy increased the likelihood that the Soviets would launch  
a preemptive strike against the U.S.
38
 Increased Soviet vulnerability, argued some, including Schelling, 
could paradoxically increase the threat to the U.S. If counterforce was destabilizing in this way,  
it would be better to go back to targeting cities, holding them, essentially as hostages. 
McNamara, who initially endorsed counterforce because it offered the prospect of fighting a limited 
rather than an all-out nuclear war, now found that his success in championing it provided justification 
for even greater demands on the part of the Air Force for weaponry, which he wanted to restrain as he 
built up conventional forces. Although SIOP-63 was never altered to reflect this, McNamara soon 
cooled on counterforce, and began emphasizing the importance of Assured Destruction, eventually 
Mutually Assured Destruction. It was enough, he and Kennedy decided, if the U.S., having absorbed  
a Soviet first strike, could destroy a quarter of the Soviet population and half its industrial capacity.  
In 1962, Kennedy and McNamara decided unilaterally to limit US land based ICBMs to 1054  
(1000 Minutemen plus the existing 54 Titans), down from the 10,000 pressed for by SAC and the 3000 
ultimately requested by the Air Force [17, p. 95]. 
                                                 
38 This was particularly so in the early 1980s when President Reagan committed to a missile defense system. Although 
most are aware of how close the U.S. and U.S.S.R. came to nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two countries 
came extremely close again in 1983 because the Soviets, listening to the bellicose rhetoric of the Reagan administration, 
and observing the unprecedented U.S. peacetime military buildup, became convinced the U.S. was preparing for a first 
strike against them (see [17], [29, pp. 345–346]). 
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By 1965 McNamara had come full circle, arriving at something close to the Eisenhower/Dulles 
doctrine of massive retaliation that had prevailed a decade earlier.
39
 McNamara’s disenchantment with 
counterforce and return to 1950s era strategic doctrine coincides roughly with what Trachtenberg [12] 
has identified as the beginning of the exhaustion of strategic thinking.
40
 
For the last half century we have, in a sense, been replaying old tapes. None of the issues involving 
how to make a threat credible, whether to target cities or military assets (counterforce or countervalue), 
whether we should prepare for assured destruction or limited conventional war, whether or not flexible 
response is desirable—none of these issues is new. All were identified and actively debated prior to the 
mid-1960s. The arguments raised in the 1970s and 1980s, ranging from those articulated by members 
of the Committee on the Present Danger (established in 1976) to the pressure to establish an 
“independent” Team B challenge to the CIA’s estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions (1976), to 
those that almost led to war with the Soviet Union in 1983, were the same as had been articulated 
earlier, with in many cases the same cast of characters or their protégés [17, pp. 124–126, 150–157]. It 
is symptomatic of the exhaustion of strategic thinking—and a tacit acknowledgment that game theory 
premised on rational self-regarding agents could not ultimately offer much help in formulating 
strategy—that after 1966, Schelling moved away from issues of nuclear policy (see, e.g., [32]). 
Schelling’s contribution to targeting debates during the heyday of strategic thinking is unclear, in 
part because he was often of two minds about many of the issues. He spent a year at RAND in 1959 
and was thus connected to and familiar with the think tank out of which the ideas of graduated 
escalation and counterforce emerged. But Schelling was ultimately lukewarm toward these concepts. 
Certainly people like William Kaufman were more central in articulating and advancing the doctrine. 
Schelling ran war games at Camp David in September 1961, with Blue and Red Teams consisting of 
U.S. military strategists, including among others John McNaughton, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, 
McGeorge Bundy, and Henry Kissinger. The results, which might be considered an unusual form of 
behavioral research, revealed rather striking inhibitions against going nuclear, even in a small way [30, p. 
302]. 
                                                 
39 US policy cycled back again to emphasize counterforce in the 1970s. Following Vietnam, Schelling moved away from 
direct involvement with the government and military policy. In 1970 he led a faculty delegation protesting Nixon’s 
involvement in Cambodia; this action effectively ended his role as a defense intellectual. See Schelling [26]. 
40 “Strategy as an intellectual discipline came alive in the United States in the 1950s. A very distinctive, influential and 
conceptually powerful body of thought emerged. But by 1966 or so, this intellectual tradition had more or less run its 
course [12, p. 261]… there was an intellectual vacuum in the whole national security area. The economists, and people 
heavily influenced by their style of thinking were for a variety of reasons drawn into this vacuum. What they had was 
something very general, a way of approaching issues, rather than anything that in itself suggested substantive answers 
that went right to the heart of the strategic problem. Looking back at this body of thought as a whole, it is clear that the 
publication of Schelling’s Arms and Influence in 1966 marked something of a climax. After 1966 the field went into a 
period of decline: the well seemed to have run dry, the ideas were by and large no longer fresh or exciting…” [12, p. 
44].  
I would go beyond this, and, to extend the metaphor, suggest that there never was water in the well: The methods were 
as barren of useful insights in the 1950s as they were acknowledged to be by the mid-1960s. 
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Subsequently Schelling directed an interdepartmental group within the National Security Council 
which “examined certain long-range aspects of political military planning.”41 The report, A Study of 
the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union, completed a week before Kennedy 
was assassinated, looked at how the U.S. and Soviet Union might bargain to bring a nuclear war to 
conclusion under a variety of different scenarios [33]. 
Schelling’s writings, which emphasized controlled escalation and limited shots across the bow to 
advance national objectives but also stressed trying to keep war from getting out of control, were more 
consonant with SIOP-63, with its flexible response, than SIOP-62, with its inflexible massive 
retaliation. But Schelling was ambivalent about counterforce: Trachtenberg describes Schelling in 
1960 as “being pulled in both directions”, indicating that he ultimately came down in favor of  
a controlled counter-population (countervalue) strategy, which some of his colleagues found cruel or 
bizarre [12, pp. 35–38]. Certainly counterforce allowed for graduated escalation, which Schelling 
favored, whereas if massive retaliation were to be viewed as entailing bargaining it was going to be a 
pretty short conversation. 
Counterforce, on the other hand, risked blurring the bright line between conventional and nuclear 
weapons, which as emphasized in his Nobel lecture and Appendix A of The Strategy of Conflict, he 
valued. And one could argue, consistent with Schelling’s writings, that the inflexibility of massive 
retaliation/cities only/mutual assured destruction made the policy a more effective deterrent and thus, 
arguably, contributed to preventing war. The more inflexible the response, however, the greater the 
danger from false alarms (false indications of incoming missiles or bombers). The merits of 
counterforce were nevertheless ambiguous and Schelling’s attitude towards it conflicted, as indeed 
McNamara’s came to be. Schelling’s support for a bright line between conventional and nuclear 
weapons was at odds with the elements of his thinking that emphasized bargaining, competition in 
taking dangerous risks, flexible response, and graduated escalation. 
Schelling’s overarching framework, like that of Clausewitz, emphasized that war and diplomacy 
should be considered elements of a broad spectrum of bargaining behavior, and the emphasis on risk 
manipulation can be seen as support for a particular type of brinksmanship [12, p. 45].
42
 The scenarios 
worked through in the 1963 NSC report were illustrations of how this might work. Of course, neither 
Schelling nor anyone else has yet had actual experience fighting and bargaining within the context of a 
nuclear war. Alain Enthoven once shut down a general who questioned Enthoven’s expertise by noting 
that he had fought just as many nuclear wars as had the general [30, p. 254]. No one really knows how 
or whether one could bargain in a controlled way in the heat of threatening or actually exchanging 
salvos with a nuclear adversary. There is an enormous range of problems. For example, with civilian 
and military targets often only a few miles apart, how could one have counted on the Soviets to 
understand, in the face of a barrage of incoming missiles, that the attack was counterforce only, and 
thus be persuaded not to go after U.S. cities? 
                                                 
41 Under the Kennedy administration, Schelling participated in a number of interagency committees, including one that 
led to the establishment of the hotline between Moscow and Washington. See Schelling, [26]. 
42 There is some irony here given the general antipathy of Democratic policy advisors to what were sometimes seen as the 
dangerous and reckless policies of Dulles and Eisenhower. 
Games 2014, 5 71 
 
 
Although Schelling could explore the conduct of nuclear war only through simulations, he did have 
an opportunity to apply his insights to the waging of conventional war. The experience was not a 
happy one. He was asked in 1961 by Paul Nitze, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, to come to Washington as his arms control deputy. Schelling demurred, but 
recommended his friend John McNaughton, with whom he had worked in the early 1950s administering 
the Marshall Plan. McNaughton at first resisted, saying he knew little about arms and strategy, but 
Schelling promised to teach him everything he needed to know. McNaughton went to Washington, 
where he was instrumental in persuading the Pentagon not to block the limited Arms Control Treaty  
of 1963, which banned atmospheric testing. When Nitze became Secretary of the Navy in 1963, 
McNaughton became Assistant Secretary of Defense. 
In 1964, he was charged by McGeorge Bundy with developing an “integrated political-military plan 
for action against North Vietnam.” The plan, based on Schelling’s ideas about how to wage limited 
war, was to use graduated escalation, employing large numbers of troops as a deterrent to the North’s 
invasion of the South and then applying pressure on the North through an air campaign. The idea was 
to wait for, or possibly invite a provocation from the North and then retaliate with a measured air 
campaign to force North Vietnam to change its behavior. 
In planning that campaign, McNaughton visited Schelling to try and figure out the answers to 
several questions: what did the U.S. want North Vietnam to do or stop doing, how would bombing 
make them alter their behavior, how would the U.S. know this had happened, and what would prevent 
the North from reverting to what it had been doing previously once the bombing stopped? The two 
strategists were unable to come up with answers to any of these questions, although Schelling did 
advise McNaughton to limit the bombing to three weeks. 
The campaign, code-named Rolling Thunder, failed to alter the behavior of the North Vietnamese, 
if anything, hardening their attitude, and solidifying their will [30, pp. 334–335].43 
4. Taking Data to the Theory 
Thomas Hobbes’ work Leviathan (1651, [34]) has for decades been understood as the classic  
non-formal evocation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Schelling does not place the PD front and center in 
his 1960 book (there are a few references to it at the end) although it is central to the problems he 
explored. This centrality is recognized in the Nobel citation, which began with an evocation of the  
Hobbesian dilemma: 
Wars and other conflicts are among the main sources of human misery. A minimum of 
cooperation is a prerequisite for a prosperous society. Life in an anarchic “state of nature” with 
its struggle of every man against every man is, in Thomas Hobbes’ (1651) famous phrase, 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. 
                                                 
43 The problem with using threats or pressure effectively is that it requires that the entity threatened respond rationally. In 
contrast, successful deterrence requires a number of areas in which irrational logic and thought processes must prevail 
(refusing to attack in the first place; actually retaliating after deterrence has failed). The hubris of much strategic 
thinking comes in its confidence that one can know or specify in advance in what realms rational thought processes will 
and will not prevail, both in oneself and in one’s opponent. 
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The citation goes on to provide a capsule history of the development of game theory. But it is  
hard to see, realistically, how advances in pure theory have helped us, or are likely to help us in 
understanding the behavior of nuclear adversaries. One can read Schelling’s position on game theory 
in The Strategy of Conflict as inconsistent, or characterize it as acknowledging its limitations but 
suggesting that with improvements it could do the job.
44
 In his review of Schelling [20],  
Rapoport [22]) questioned the likelihood of this. He argued that the challenge was not simply to 
improve upon a slightly flawed approach: 
These ideas, especially some of the striking paradoxes, are interesting and stimulating. I believe, 
however, that they indicate the necessity of transcending game theoretical thinking (i.e., thinking 
exclusively in strategic terms) rather than the need to incorporate into the theory of games 
matters which do not fit into its conceptual repertoire… The fact remains that there is no 
rationally justifiable conclusion that leads the two players of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
without communication to insure for themselves the largest joint pay-off. Such an outcome can 
result only if “irrational” considerations are allowed to determine the choice of strategy, for 
example, “solidarity,” “trust,” “the determination to do the right thing, no matter what the 
consequences may be,” etc. Such considerations have until now been anathema to the realists. 
Among the strategists, it is perfectly proper to advocate “calculated risks” based on bluff, 
blackmail, and intimidation, but risks based on trust (which admittedly may be misplaced, else 
the risks would not be risks) fall automatically outside the scope of strategy because the 
associated concepts are not even in the vocabulary of the strategist. 
Rapoport is not always completely on target (it is now well understood, for instance, that the PD 
with communication is formally identical to the game without it) but his basic point is well taken. 
Schelling respected Rapoport—there is a footnote in The Strategy of Conflict referring to one of his 
earlier essays as magnificent [20, p. 7], but we may infer that this review struck too close to home. 
When Schelling reviewed Rapoport’s Strategy and Conscience three years later, his tone was 
uncharacteristically harsh [35]. Rapoport’s book is a sprawling affair, containing at its best some deep 
insights into probability theory, and some lucid critiques of the strategic way of thinking and its 
dangers, but one can legitimately criticize it from a number of angles. Nevertheless, one is struck in 
reading Schelling’s review by the animus he appears to bear towards the author. Schelling appears 
quite angry, angry that Rapoport has tarred all strategists with the same brush, has failed to distinguish 
good theory from bad, and didn’t have the courtesy to contact his targets to ask them what they in fact 
thought (rather than, perhaps defensibly, inferring it from their writings). My interpretation is that at 
the time Schelling felt compelled to defend those whose aim was to apply and improve game theory,  
a group in which he included himself. And yet, if one focuses on Chapter 6 of Schelling [20], 
Rapoport’s and Schelling’s understandings of and acknowledgements of the limitations of formal 
theory were not very far apart. 
                                                 
44 Still, if his position was that the theory lacked much predictive or explanatory power now, but might, with 
improvement, have it in the future, what was the justification for extensive inclusion of game theoretic apparatus in  
a book devoted to analyzing pressing current problems? 
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The referenced passages from The Strategy of Conflict and Schelling’s review of Rapoport are  
the basis for the interpretation that Schelling was inconsistent in acknowledging or addressing the 
shortcomings of game theory as a prescriptive and descriptive guide to behavior, and conflicted about 
its prospects and his role as a theorist. These ambivalences, if anything, became deeper with time. In  
a symposium in his honor at Harvard University in October 2006 [36], Schelling observed that the 
Nobel citation gave him cause to reflect on whether he “was then or ever had been a game theorist.” 
He recalled that he learned what theory he knows from Luce and Raiffa [24], a book he spent “more 
time studying than the Holy Bible,” but noted that the Nobel committee seemed most impressed by 
work he had published before Luce and Raiffa appeared, and before he had read it. 
This last is a very puzzling claim, since the Nobel citation states that Schelling received the prize 
for “developing non-cooperative game theory further”, and it is hard to see how he could have  
made progress on this account prior to digesting Luce and Raiffa. Certainly, the avidity with which  
(by self-report) he consumed the work
45
 suggests that he had high hopes it would be useful to him.  
By the end of 1950s, however, as evidenced in The Strategy of Conflict, he was aware of its 
limitations. That realization would have been unsettling to anyone schooled in the merits of rational 
choice analysis, and doubly troubling in a world in which rewards (honorifics, professional 
advancement) for apparently applying game theory to real world problems remained so high. In 
Schelling [20], any concern on this account was papered over by taking the optimistic position that 
yes, the theory was limited in its predictive or explanatory value, but future progress would resolve 
these deficiencies. 
Formal game theory can be beautiful from an aesthetic perspective and challenging in terms of the 
mathematical and logical puzzles it presents. Social scientists benefit from a basic understanding of its 
concepts and principles if only to appreciate its limitations and because it has become part of the 
intellectual landscape. But if one is interested in solving real world problems, or using theory to 
understand human behavior, it is quite often a cul de sac. Ariel Rubinstein has probably been most 
forthright about this, arguing that formal theory simply should not be “a tool for predicting or 
describing real human behavior” [37, p. 616].46 Rubinstein did not, however, necessarily conclude 
from this that research in game theory be shut down. A close reading is that his plea is that 
experimentalists and students of the real world stop harassing theorists with the disjuncture between 
theory and behavior.
47
 Howard Raiffa (one of the coauthors of Schelling’s “bible”), reached a 
somewhat similar conclusion, largely abandoning the theory program in his later career, and instead 
focusing on the practicalities of negotiation rather than its mathematical analysis (compare [24] with 
[38]). Anatol Rapoport said essentially the same thing as Rubinstein forty years earlier: 
The theory of games has been developed much beyond the zero-sum game, and it is not the fault 
of the theoreticians that the results are so frequently indeterminate or psychologically 
disturbing. The mathematical theory of games was never meant to be a behavioral theory, but 
                                                 
45 He recollects that he spent between 100 and 200 hours reading it (Schelling, [26]). 
46 For evidence of similar attitudes in political science, in particular the assertion that logical consistency is more 
important than empirical validity, see Walt [39]). 
47 Economists often talk of taking theory (or a new model) to the data. The objection here seems to be to the efforts of 
behavioralists and experimentalists to take data to the theory. 
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only a mathematical one, which examines the internal logic of certain situations without 
necessarily drawing conclusions about what this internal logic may imply in human affairs [40, 
p. 437]. 
There can scarcely be any “problem in the social sciences” of greater import than that of 
understanding relations among nuclear adversaries. It is not surprising if what theory has actually 
delivered in this area has been a disappointment if the theory was never meant to be behavioral. 
5. The Logic of First Strike 
If agents are rational and self-regarding, there can be no logic of deterrence, only one of first strike. 
Von Neumann argued famously, with respect to the Soviets, “If you say why not bomb them 
tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o’clock, I say why not 1 o’clock?” ([12, p. 104]; 
Blair, 1957, cited in [16, p. 143]). As he neared death in 1957, he confided to his friend Hilary Putnam, 
a philosophy professor at Harvard, about his pessimistic view of the future. Von Neumann told Putnam 
he was “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war and (2) that everyone would die from 
it” [41, p. 114].48 
Von Neumann’s analysis and conclusions were common at the time among intellectuals and those 
who had thought seriously about nuclear war, both before and after the arrival of thermonuclear 
weapons. Three years later, on the front page of the New York Times, the British Novelist C. P. Snow 
made a similar prediction, stating that absent massive disarmament, thermonuclear war within a 
decade was a “mathematical certainty.” As Schelling pointed out in his Nobel lecture, nobody at the 
time found this claim exaggerated [2]. Given what we know of the Emergency War Plan of the late 
1950s or SIOP-62, or the Berlin crisis of 1961, or the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, or U.S.—Soviet 
tensions in 1983, this is not surprising. Von Neumann, had he still been alive in 1960, might have 
asked, why not sooner? 
The failure accurately to predict has not inhered in the logic. The problem is with the implied 
behavioral assumptions. A taboo not codified in any treaty has kept nuclear weapons from being used 
against an adversary since 1945, just as a taboo kept poison gas from being used in the Second World 
War. In his Nobel lecture Schelling is rightly interested in these normative constraints on behavior and 
the degree to which they give rise to behavior at odds with what was predicted and counseled by  
von Neumann. Some behavioral inhibitions—in my view as much biological in origin as they are 
cultural—checked the pressures on or inclinations of leaders to attack. Our survival has depended  
upon the fact that decisions makers were and are, in some respects, the opposite of rational and  
self-regarding. It has depended in part on the fact that they were and are human. 
There is no practical defense against ICBMs. There is therefore, as Richard Rhodes puts it, “no 
military solution to safety in the nuclear age” [17, p. 101]. Game theoretic analysis, which commonly 
assumes that players are logical, rational, and self-regarding, leads to the conclusion that the surest and 
                                                 
48 Von Neumann hated communists and had no moral qualms about working on the H Bomb project. From an early date 
he looked forward to nuclear conflict between the two superpowers. He expressed this anticipation in a 1951 letter to 
Lewis Strauss: “I think that the USA-USSR conflict will very probably lead to an armed ‘total’ collision, and that a 
maximum rate of armament is therefore imperative” [30, p. 63]. 
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most effective way to reduce this vulnerability is to launch a surprise attack aimed at an adversary’s 
offensive weapons. Because players are human, however, and sometimes prone to retaliate to attack if 
they can, even if it gains them little or nothing, or even makes their deteriorated situation even worse, 
this is an almost certain invitation to mutual incineration. The effort to ground strategy in game theory 
produces, using Robert Jervis’ words, “doctrines which are incoherent and filled with contradictions, 
which though they are superficially alluring, upon close examination do not make sense” [18, p. 19].49 
In his Nobel autobiography, Schelling tried to interpret the convention against use of nuclear 
weapons as an example of a focal point. But this is not an appropriate use of the concept. Pure games 
of coordination have multiple equilibria, and the concept of a focal point refers to the role of tacit or 
implicit knowledge in enabling players to coordinate on one of them. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not  
a pure game of coordination. It has only one equilibrium (unlike the New York meeting problem that 
Schelling popularized), and that equilibrium is inefficient, unlike any of the equilibria in a typical 
coordination game. The no-nukes “convention” is not a Nash equilibrium, as disgruntled advocates  
of preemption have pointed out again and again, and there are strong incentives, pressures, and 
temptations for players to deviate from it, in contrast to what is true for a coordination game 
equilibrium once reached. If there are norms (whether biological or cultural in their origin) which 
incline us to the cooperative solution in PDs, they are different from the social or cultural norms  
that contribute to a focal point. The former require in some respects that we be the opposite of  
self-regarding, whereas the latter (such as those, within a common language area, that allow us to 
agree on the meaning of a word) do not (Field, [42]). We are best served by acknowledging these 
differences rather than suggesting that these types of norms are of the same genus. 
The analysis of games of coordination does help us understand the role of tacit or implicit 
knowledge in solving such problems as which side of the moving walkway to stand on, or where, in a 
pre-cell phone age, and in the absence of prearrangement, we should meet in New York. In that sense, 
Schelling has contributed to the use of game theory to understand “everyday economics”, to use 
Warsh’s words, or “familiar everyday problems”, to use the words of the Nobel citation. 
But the economic and social significance of coordination problems pales in comparison to those 
presented by Hobbesian dilemmas, and the Nobel citation’s emphasis on Schelling’s contribution to 
the analysis of “non-cooperative games that involve both common and conflicting interests” makes it 
clear that they had in mind the latter category of social dilemmas. The reality is first that Schelling 
made little contribution to the formal development of non-cooperative game theory and second that 
such theory is of little value in understanding how humans solve Hobbesian, or Prisoner’s Dilemmas. 
On both of these counts, then, the Nobel citation reflects a certain amount of misdirection. 
In the long run it matters little why someone wins the Nobel Prize. What does matter in the social 
sciences is correctly identifying what types of contribution advance our understanding of human 
behavior. The challenge of understanding what contributes to collective action or collective inaction 
                                                 
49 He goes on to argue, “To argue that any nuclear doctrine must be at least partly irrational does not mean that all 
doctrines are equally at odds with the reality they try to reflect and shape. If one starts with misleading conceptions, the 
more complete and thorough the reasoning, the stranger and more confusing the results. Only by understanding and 
accepting the implications of nuclear weapons can we develop a more appropriate policy. But even such a policy cannot 
meet all the standards we normally require of rationality” [18, p. 20]. 
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(restraints on harm) beyond the family are central to social and behavioral science. Claims to advance 
must be carefully vetted, with the most important criterion not formal axiomatic consistency but the 
extent to which actual human behavior is explained or predicted. Misdirection with respect to the 
contributions of game theory has been facilitated by a finding of common ground among those who 
love the intellectual challenges it poses, even as they acknowledge its limited applicability to actual 
human behavior (e.g., Rubinstein), and a broader audience that understands enough about the approach 
to appreciate its apparent potential, but not enough to recognize its limitations. 
Deterrence can only work if in some respect humans are not rational in their logic and/or  
self-regarding in their preferences. A strategy of defensive deterrence has two main pillars: (1) each 
counterparty refrains from first strike; and (2) will in fact retaliate in the event deterrence fails. Neither 
pillar, von Neumann appreciated, could be defended as the behavior of a self-regarding rational actor. 
To von Neumann, failure to strike first was irrational and foolish. It was foolish because it  
exposed one’s country to the risk of being hit first. And since the nuclear counterparty had access to 
similar logic, and assuming the adversary was also a self-regarding rational actor, the attack must be 
imminent.
50
 If missiles were not already inbound it was only because the adversary was also behaving 
in a foolish manner. To refrain from attacking first was to put one’s faith in irrational behavior on the 
part of one’s counterpart. And, if one’s counterpart were behaving in a foolish fashion, failure to strike 
first meant passing up an opportunity to gain at her expense. In a thermonuclear world, to refrain from 
first strike was to refrain from defecting in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game which would have more than 
one play only if both parties irrationally chose not to defect. 
Some have explained the failure of the United States to wage preventive war in the early 1950s as 
due to its self-perception as relatively weak [12, pp. 100–115]. Yet in 1961, when intelligence revealed 
the disarray and weakness of Soviet strategic forces, and Khrushchev’s nuclear bluster had been shown 
to be largely a bluff, the U.S. again passed on the preemption option. Conditions were more favorable 
for a U.S. first strike than they had been at any time since the late 1940s. And in his September 1961 
war games, Schelling could not get either the Blue or the Red teams to go nuclear, no matter how hard 
he provoked. In the policy domain, the 1961 Kaysen plan at the height of the Berlin crisis was rejected, 
even as a contingency [30, pp. 299–300]. Something obviously restrained the willingness of even 
tough minded strategists like Kaysen and Kissinger to act on the logic of first strike. Von Neumann 
must have turned over in his grave. 
As many have pointed out, the second pillar of deterrence, the promise of retaliation, also requires 
behavior that cannot be justified as rational. Having decided (irrationally) to refrain from first strike, 
the threat of retaliation is intended to deter a counterparty from doing the rational thing, which is to 
attack first. But if the attack has already happened, deterrence has failed. With many U.S. cities in 
ruins, of what possible value would have been the destruction of millions of Soviet lives, simply to 
prove, after the fact, that we had “meant” what we said when we promised/threatened retaliation? 
The threat of massive retaliation would not be credible if the counterparty believed one were 
completely rational because it would make no sense to carry through on it after the fact. This train of 
logic leads to the conclusion that a rational actor should not and would not be deterred from attacking 
                                                 
50 See Kahn, ([13], pp. 151–152, cited in Rapoport, [40], p. 134). Kahn describes an imagined conversation between  
a Soviet general and Khrushchev as they consider the pros and cons of a first strike on the United States. 
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by a threat of retaliation so long as she assumed the target was rational, because a rational victim of 
aggression would not retaliate. It is easy to threaten retaliation, but talk is cheap. This reality helps 
illuminate the obsession of military planners with inflexibility, as they have struggled over the years to 
make retaliatory threats credible. 
Schelling argued that madmen could not easily be deterred by threats of retaliation [20, p. 6].  
An apparent corollary is that those who are rational (not mad) can be deterred. But as this analysis 
reveals, you cannot deter a rational actor who also believes you are rational, because your threats of 
retaliation will not be credible. 
This issue exposes one of the soft underbellies of strategic thinking, and is one that Schelling chose 
not to probe too deeply. In Arms and Influence [43] he cited Max Lerner, writing in The Age of 
Overkill (1962) that “The operation of the deterrence principle in preventing war depends upon an 
almost flawless rationality on both sides.” ([44, p. 27], cited in Schelling, [43], p. 229). Without 
directly challenging or contradicting Lerner’s claim Schelling dryly notes that “…when people say that 
“irrationality” spoils deterrence they mean—or ought to mean—only particular brands of it” [43, p. 
229]. 
The practical success of deterrence rests in part on the fact that the very act of refraining from first 
strike, which is demonstrably not rational, may increase the credibility of a threat of retaliation. By 
contravening the counsel of von Neumann and other aggressive preempters, an actor illustrates by  
her restrained behavior a willingness to behave in an irrational although still apparently instrumental 
fashion. Thus a counterparty might, for this reason, think twice about dismissing the threat of massive 
retaliation on the grounds that such retaliation would, after the fact, be irrational. 
Strategists like von Neumann argued that a nuclear war initiated by a U.S. first strike could be won, 
if the U.S. possessed sufficient strategic superiority, and this argument surfaced again and again in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. There were several targeting strategies to choose from. One could focus 
principally on military targets, to degrade or eliminate second strike capability. Or one could focus on 
CCC—command, control and communication—decapitation strikes that killed leaders and destroyed 
communications capability, so that even if weapons survived and decision makers were (irrationally) 
angry and prepared to retaliate, the weapons would not be fired. Or one could stick with the traditional 
cities only strategy, demoralizing the Soviets (“Shock and Awe”) to make sure that there was little or 
no (irrational) will or desire left for retaliation. Advocates of preemption stressed that in order for the 
U.S. to face a risk of retaliation, both the Soviet capability and the will to retaliate had to survive our 
first strike. And even if there was some probability that both did survive, winning the war could be 
defined as the U.S. suffering lower relative losses. 
Success for the U.S. as aggressor would require combining an assumption of rational first strike on 
our part with irrational restraint on first strike on the part of the Soviets (otherwise the Soviets would 
already have attacked and U.S. would not have been able to strike first) followed by rational behavior 
by the Soviets following our strike (why bother retaliating since their effort to deter us had obviously 
failed). If, in contrast, we believed the Soviets would be consistently irrational in their behavior 
(irrational restraint combined with irrational retaliation in the event we attacked) we might, if we were 
rational, be deterred from attacking. 
But note that the non-aggression outcome associated with symmetric adoption of mutual assured 
destruction required asymmetric assumptions about the rationality of each of the adversaries.  
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To navigate in these clouded waters we will be less helped by game theory than by an 
understanding of social psychology, the theory of mind,
52
 and such regularities as the fundamental 
attribution error.
53
 Contrary to Lerner’s argument, successful deterrence requires not flawless 
rationality but elements of irrationality—sometimes real, sometimes perceived—on the part of both 
parties. It is likely that the predispositions that allow deterrence to work have in part a biological 
foundation (see Field, [5–8,10]). 
If the scenarios for aggressive war pushed by von Neumann and others seemed to gamble with the 
nation’s fate (what if the assumptions were off by a bit; was it OK if “only” five to thirteen million 
Americans died?), preempters had a ready answer. Their proposals were driven not just by 
opportunistic calculations, but by fears that the Soviets were making exactly the same calculations, 
planning to fight and win a limited nuclear war (see, e.g., Kaysen [31], or arguments advanced by the 
Committee on the Present Danger in the 1970s and 1980s). And if that were true, it was clearly in the 
U.S. interest to attack first. Would those who hesitated prefer confronting the aftermath of a Soviet 
first strike on the United States, with degraded hardware, disrupted command and communication, 
and/or devastated cities? From this it’s a short distance to von Neumann’s if you say 5 PM, I say why 
not 1 PM. The U.S. military was acutely aware of vulnerabilities in its own command and control 
systems, and resisted modifications in SIOP-62 on this account. It wanted inflexible response. The 
concern was that even if U.S. weapons survived a Soviet strike, the relevant individuals
54
 might not be 
able or willing to launch them. 
Schelling, of course, preferred to win without fighting, or by fighting as little as possible (“a theory 
of deterrence would be in effect a theory of the skillful nonuse of military forces” [20, p. 9]). But he 
acknowledged at least implicitly the asymmetric but complementary roles rationality and irrationality 
would have to play in successful deterrence, although they were the reverse of what was needed for 
successful first strike. 
Schelling repeatedly emphasized the potential role played by irrationality: 
                                                 
51 Robert Jervis was exploring similar issues when he wrote, in 1984, that “A rational strategy for employing nuclear 
weapons is a contradiction in terms” [18, p. 19]. 
52 Theory of mind involves such questions as how animals (including humans) infer another’s knowledge or intentions 
from the direction of its gaze, the timbre of its voice, or the expression on its face (for discussion, see Cheney and 
Seyfarth [45]). In game theory, none of this matters: there is promise of a parsimonious short cut to inferring intention. 
Sometimes, but by no means always, this short cut provides good predictions, but where it fails, and when the setting is 
nuclear confrontation, the failures are particularly problematic. 
53 The error, which has been widely demonstrated, is to assume that my behavior is governed by the situation while yours 
is governed by your disposition, in short, to assume that I’m rational and you’re not. Since the success of mutual 
assured destruction requires mutually asymmetric assumptions about the rationality of the two parties, deterrence could 
not succeed in the absence of this cognitive bias. The classic study is Ross [45]). 
54 It would be perhaps a misnomer to call them decision makers, because the whole point of inflexible response was that 
they were not supposed to be making decisions. 
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“It is not a universal advantage in situations of conflict to be inalienably and manifestly rational 
in decision and motivation. Many of the attributes of rationality, as in several illustrations 
mentioned earlier, are strategic disabilities in certain conflict situations” [20, p. 18]. 
But he does not confront the theoretical incoherence of a model that requires that each adversary 
believe that they are rational whereas their adversary is not, or that they are rational but must make 
their adversary believe the opposite, or that they are or will be rational in some instances but not 
others. We have already seen that a rational attacker (A) would not find credible the threat of 
retaliation by B if A attributed rationality and self-regarding preferences to B. A cannot be deterred by 
B if she attributes rationality and self-regarding preferences to B. If A is rational and self-regarding 
and has not attacked, it must be because of her attribution of some degree of irrationality to B (in other 
words, A must have some fear of retaliation). But if that is so, the merely threatened use of nuclear 
arms by A in an attempt to alter B’s behavior in ways distinct from simply refraining from attacking 
would also lack credibility. If A is deterred today by B’s irrational threat of retaliation, why should that 
be any different tomorrow? Aggressive preemption or the threat of aggressive preemption by A will 
succeed only if B combines irrational restraint prior to A’s attack (else why would A have the 
opportunity to strike first?) with rational calculation of B’s self-interest following A’s strike. 
If we are wedded to a rational choice modeling approach, should we not expect at least a 
consistency in the irrationality of B before and after A’s rational strike? Experimental research makes 
it abundantly clear that humans are inclined to have their behavior influenced by both rational and 
irrational thought processes, and it sometimes makes a big difference which prevail. Formal game 
theory offers us no help in estimating those probabilities. If your fate and the fate of the world 
depended upon it, would you rather your political leaders be good intuitive psychologists, skilled  
at inferring the emotions, motives, beliefs, and intentions of counterparties, and of themselves, or  
well-trained game theorists? 
To accept the argument that nonaggressive deterrence (peaceful coexistence) requires a 
combination of irrational and rational behavior on the part of both parties is not to reject such 
strategies as worth pursuing, nor is it to argue against being deterred in the face of a determined and 
committed opponent. Such policies and behavior often are worth advocating and pursuing, and as an 
empirical matter often have worked as they were intended. The problem for game theory is that in  
a world of self-regarding agents, there is always a stronger (more hard-headed, more tough-minded) 
case to be made for preemption. Allowing oneself to become too absorbed in the strategic way of 
thinking runs the risk of finding oneself in a race to the bottom, in which aggressive policies 
systematically trump those that are less so. 
Leslie Groves’ advocacy of a policy of destroying the relevant facilities in any country that might 
threaten to develop nuclear weapons sounded much like Vice President Cheney’s advocacy of a broad 
license for preemption more than half a century later: “If there’s a 1 percent chance that Pakistani 
scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in 
terms of our response. It’s not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of the evidence. …It’s 
about our response” [47, p. 62]. Since a 1 percent probability is low, its estimation subjective, and one 
Cheney proposed the United States arrogate to itself, there was little limit, if this doctrine were 
accepted, to the range of targets an attack upon which could still be clothed in the rhetoric of defense. 
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What is troubling about a policy of preemptive or preventive war, as applied to Iraq, and possibly to 
Iran or North Korea, are the implications for the U.S. if it is adopted by other nations. What it means is 
that any nation, on its own say so, would be justified in attacking the United States or any other 
country if it judged that there was even a very small probability that the United States might attack it. 
From a standpoint of rational choice theory and a model of a world consisting of self-regarding agents, 
there is no error in this reasoning.
55
 International law has always recognized the right of a nation to 
protect itself by attacking an adversary when an attack from that adversary is “imminent”. 
The Cold War spanned four decades, and its epicenter can be said to have been Berlin. The conflict 
began in 1947, two years before the blockade and airlift. Conflict over the city brought us close to 
nuclear war in 1961. The Cold War ended with the fall of the Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse 
of the Soviet Union (1991). For U.S. baby boomers the Cold War was an omnipresent fact of life,  
a feature of it from their birth until, to the surprise of many and consternation of some, the conflict 
suddenly ended a quarter century ago. The Cold War defined the political, strategic, and intellectual 
milieu within which Schelling’s most influential work was conducted. 
Over most of that period, a philosophy and strategy of containment and deterrence helped prevent 
thermonuclear war between two well-armed adversaries, the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Neither launched a surprise attack on the other. The question I have asked in this essay is whether the 
success of the Cold War stalemate depended upon the rational and self-regarding behavior of both 
parties, and on each party’s belief that the other was rational and self-regarding. If it did, then the 
interaction of these two adversaries would indeed be a fitting subject for game theory. Lerner claimed 
that it did and it was. Schelling danced around the question. To challenge the assumption made by 
Lerner that successful deterrence required consistent (flawless) rationality on the part of all parties too 
directly might have undercut the impression that game theory/rational choice approaches were central 
to the conclusions of his analysis. 
That said, Schelling appears to have recognized the flaws in Lerner’s claim. Without acknowledging 
the poor predictive power of models premised on rational choice by self-regarding agents, in particular 
the fact that individuals often do refrain from first strike, even when rational analysis indicated, as  
von Neumann protested repeatedly, that it is in their interest to do otherwise, and that they often will 
respond in kind to attack, even when this makes no sense ex post, there would have been no 
explanatory space for the topics that interested Schelling. There would be no arena for  
the murky world of threats and promises, driven by conflicting behavioral predispositions within 
individual humans themselves and characterized by the asymmetrical ability to benefit others by 
failing to do them harm as opposed to providing them with affirmative assistance. It is his 
acknowledgment of that world of shadows, in which things were not always what they seem, and what 
                                                 
55 Note that a similar issue applies to the abandonment of the Geneva conventions, which former Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzalez characterized as “quaint.” There is little reason from a game theoretic perspective why the Geneva 
conventions should be respected, but clearly to some degree they are and have been, and many in the U.S. military 
objected to the US adoption of methods of torture, which resulted in the deaths of tens of captives, on the grounds that 
such actions threatened the protections available to captured American soldiers. 
Games 2014, 5 81 
 
 
seemed to be the pursuit of flawless rationality was sometimes nothing of the sort that makes 
Schelling’s work interesting.56 
6. Rational Choice 
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences saw it differently. Rather than interpreting Schelling as 
having shown that behavior interpreted as the pursuit of flawless rationality was often nothing of the 
sort, the Academy’s prize committee claimed that Schelling (and Aumann’s) contribution was to show 
the opposite: “A consequence of these endeavors is that the concept of rationality now has a wider 
interpretation; behavior which used to be classified as irrational has become understandable and 
rational” [19, p. 3]. This is misdirection. It reflects the same kind of papering over of contradictions 
which renders most discussions of U.S. strategic policy incoherent. Human behavior is what it is, and 
sophistry cannot make the play of a strictly dominated strategy rational. If x is black, and we 
understand what black means, one can’t make it white simply by reinterpreting it as white. 
In describing behavior, the word rational is often used in different ways. The broadest meaning is 
simply the claim that people act in satisfaction of their own desires. This version is not interesting from 
a scientific standpoint, since it is impossible to conceive of any behavioral data that could not be made 
consistent with it. A narrower version posits that people have goals reflected in preferences, that these 
preferences are both stable and transitive (if A if preferred to B, and B to C, then A is preferred to C), 
and that people use all available information to choose a course of action likely to lead to the realization 
of these goals. 
The third and most rhetorically powerful version of rational choice carries forward all of the 
language about goal seeking, but adds that preferences are, in addition to being stable and transitive, 
also self-regarding. Following Gintis [48], I suggest that self-regarding is superior terminology to  
self-interested, since it avoids the possible ambiguity arising when individuals experience a “warm 
glow” from helping others. Such helping behavior (and I do not mean to suggest that all helping 
behavior has this characteristic) might arguably be self-interested, but is not what we would mean  
by self-regarding. 
In using the term rational in this paper, I have meant this third, most restrictive, and most 
rhetorically powerful use of the term. Under this meaning, to assume rational choice is to assume that 
people (or countries) act so as efficiently to advance their material self-interest. 
 
                                                 
56 Schelling’s work is as much about diplomacy as the art of war fighting (as witness the title of his 1966 book: Arms and 
Influence). But, as those skeptical of diplomacy have always argued, talk is cheap, and actions speak louder than words. 
If these precepts are taken to heart, diplomacy is not part of the strategy space. As von Neumann understood, so long as 
players are rational and self-regarding, the strategy space was limited to launch or not launch, and the case for the 
former was unassailable. The idea that threats or promises might be used to further political or strategic aims 
presupposed that actors would behave in ways that could not be defended as rational. A country might threaten to 
retaliate, or threaten to build a Doomsday machine to overcome the prospect of weakness of will, but a rational actor 
would never do either. The idea, popularized by Schelling, that, short of attacking, one might create a situation where 
things might get out of control and an attack “might happen” would have struck von Neumann as mealy mouthed. “Just 
do it” would have been his reaction. 
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7. The Logic of First Strike—Once More with Feeling 
It is a commonplace among tough minded thinkers to say that talk is cheap, and actions speak 
louder than words. But rhetoric matters. It affects human attitudes and behavior, even if theory often 
suggests it shouldn’t. Most humans are inclined to support military operations in response to what is 
seen as an unprovoked attack. Public opinion tends to be less comfortable with preemptive attack, 
because the threat countered is probabilistic and thus speculative. Aside from the small fraction of 
humans with sociopathic tendencies, attack simply for personal or territorial aggrandizements is the 
toughest sell of all: most humans are repelled by it. Even the most cynical dictators find it necessary 
and desirable to justify aggression in terms of a prior litany of perceived wrongs. For this reason Hitler 
felt compelled to cloak his invasion of Poland in 1939 as preemption to counter what he claimed was 
an intolerable threat from that country. The immediate casus belli was a ginned up raid on Germany 
supposedly conducted by Polish forces. 
In 1949 there was not a 1 percent probability that the Soviets were obtaining the bomb: there was a 
100 percent chance that they had it. But surprisingly, this is beside the point in terms of the argument 
for attacking now. The logic of first strike is inexorable for an analyst consistently applying “realist” 
assumptions. It does not depend much on the size of this probability. After all, one could imagine  
a hypothetical conversation between von Neumann and former Vice President Cheney, “If you say 
attack if there’s a 1 percent probability, I say why not if there’s a 0.1 percent probability. And if you 
say 0.1, I say why not 0.01.” Because of the asymmetrical ability to benefit others by not harming 
them, as opposed to providing affirmative assistance,
57
 an asymmetry which is grossly magnified in 
the case of weapons of mass destruction, one requires very low probabilities in order to make the case 
for preventive war on these grounds. 
Now let us again consider again the second pillar of MAD: the promise or threat of retaliation. In 
order for such a threat to play any role in deterrence, it must be credible. This is, of course, a persistent 
theme in Schelling’s writings, and much subsequent game theoretic analysis.58 But let us put ourselves 
in the position of a submarine commander somewhere in the Pacific at the height of the Cold War.  
A devastating first strike has been launched by the Soviets which has wiped out New York, Chicago, 
and Los Angeles. With 16 MIRVed missiles in his tubes, the commander receives the order to launch  
a retaliatory strike on Soviet cities, one which, in 20 to 30 min, will kill thirty million people. 
Does it make any sense to extract the launch codes, and proceed with firing? What will be 
accomplished by killing an additional thirty million people? Reputation is irrelevant because this is not 
a game that will continue. So the submarine commander, if he is rational, cannot logically justify 
setting in motion the launch procedure, and a rational President cannot logically justify ordering his 
submarine commander to do so.
59
 But it gets worse. 
Since game theory generally presumes that our counterparty is as rational and logical as we are, the 
U.S. forecasts the likely response of the Soviets to a first strike attack, and concludes that their promise 
                                                 
57 “One of the lamentable principles of human productivity is that it is easier to destroy than create” (Schelling, [43, p. v]). 
58 At the October 2006 Kennedy School event, Schelling identified one of his principal concerns as “How can you make a 
promise that’s believable when it’s clear that left to your own devices you’d rather not do it” [23]. 
59 Some of his advisors felt that President Reagan had doubts he would be able to issue the launch order in such  
a circumstance, one of the reasons he was so strongly attached to the idea of a missile shield (see Rhodes, [17]). 
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of massive retaliation is hollow—cheap talk. Since if they are rational, they will not retaliate, we can 
afford to launch first strike against them with impunity.
60
 Moreover, since they will have realized that 
if the U.S. is rational, our threat of massive retaliation is also hollow, they will have concluded that 
they can launch with impunity, if we are foolish enough not to have already launched. In each case, the 
appeal of attack lies both in the prospect of removing a sword of Damocles and in the possibility of 
territorial aggrandizement or increased world influence. In the absence of any effective defense, there 
is an enormous game theoretic advantage to the offense, to moving first (Lee, [49, p. 198]). 
Schelling understood that no realistic study of international relations, just as no serious study of 
human behavior, could be premised on the assumption that agents are or should be motivated solely by 
self-regarding preferences. It is true that such preferences are strong, and underlie what I have called 
the foraging algorithms (Field, [7]). They cause us to seek food when we are hungry, and water when 
we are thirsty. But we also possess behavioral predispositions specialized for social interaction, 
including some that bias us in favor of refraining from first strike, some that make us willing to engage 
in costly (and thus other-regarding) punishment, even of third party violators, and a heightened 
sensitivity to detecting those who cheat on the social norms that commonly reflect these species typical 
behavioral predispositions. 
Schelling doesn’t address the evolutionary pathways that might have created this. I and others have, 
and make a strong argument that one must posit the operation of selection at levels higher than the 
individual organism (group or multilevel selection) in order to allow this to have happened (Wilson 
and Sober, [50]; Boehm, [51]; Field, [5, 6, 8, 10]; Wilson and Wilson, [52]). 
Once one allows for this restraint, once one acknowledges a species typical inhibition on first strike, 
one which cannot be defended as rational, and one which would not have been favored upon first 
appearance by organism level selection, one has the foundation for a realistic science of human 
behavior. One has a framework within which it becomes possible to understand why von Neumann’s 
prediction has, so far, been proved wrong. It becomes possible to see why policies of deterrence and 
containment can appeal to “natural” human impulses, as much if not more so than the press toward 
preemption and first strike, which draws support from the logical, rational capabilities associated with 
the prefrontal cortex. Whereas the counsel of our predispositions specialized for social interaction 
often agrees with that proffered by our foraging algorithms, sometimes they conflict, and sometimes 
the former trump or short circuit the latter. 
                                                 
60 Thus Powell does not appreciate that in assuming that “no political objective is worth certain destruction”, the problem 
of the credibility of US nuclear retaliation to a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe is the same as the 
credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack on US territory. And in stating what many would view as 
self-evident, that with secure second strike, “there is no situation in which it is rational for a state deliberately to launch 
a nuclear attack first” [53, p. 15].  Powell is simply wrong: this conclusion depends on assuming that one’s adversary 
will in fact retaliate. I am not saying one should attack first; if one is rational one will do so only if one believes one’s 
opponent will rationally not retaliate. Irrational human propensities to retaliate are part of the reason in the real world 
that attacks are deterred. For a similar reason, Jervis is wrong to state “There would be no reason for the Russians to 
hold back once Americans had destroyed what they value most…” [18, p. 74]. There would be no reason if they were 
human, but lots of reason if they were rational—since such retaliation would gain them precisely nothing so long as 
gains are defined in terms of material interest. 
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Of course the strength of these inhibitions varies among individuals, for reasons both biological and 
related to personal history. Of course a skilled leader can defeat them, by demonizing the enemy, or by 
conjuring threats, both real or imagined. But the point is that the inhibitions are real, they are species 
typical, and they do have to be defeated (the task of doing so is a central part of military training). It is 
because of these inhibitions, combined with the real and ever present possibility that they can be 
defeated by appeal to prudence or rational self-interest, that we have the world we live in, a dangerous 
world, but one which has been sufficiently peaceful to allow the human population to increase to over 
7 billion. 
Without these irrational inhibitions, the shadowy world of threats and promises, of the “uglier, more 
negative, less civilized part of diplomacy” (Schelling, [43], p. vi), would simply not exist. There would 
be no space for it because conflict would never be looming over us. It always would already have 
started. But it is the world as it exists, peopled with individuals who have irrational as well as rational 
behavioral predispositions, that Schelling wished to analyze and understand. That world is one in 
which the promise or threat of harm becomes a critical element of the grammar of social intercourse, 
and a central concern of Schelling was how people or nations could be influenced, how these threats or 
promises are or could be effective. Our world, and the fragile peace in which we live most of the time, 
presupposes non-Nash behavior. It is a world in which human agents, much but not all of the time, 
refrain from playing defect even though logic counsels us that defect is the only defensible play. 
For most game theorists today, the modeling crucible within which to study the emergence and 
maintenance of cooperation (non-defection) is the indefinitely repeated game.
61
 This is theoretically 
convenient, because equilibria in which people cooperate (as well as those in which they don’t) can, 
within this context, be attributed to rational self-regarding choice. But it is empirically and historically 
a poor choice if one is concerned with interactions among agents who have a power to harm each other 
which is asymmetrically larger than their ability to help each other (aside from failing to harm them). 
In thinking about behavior among adversaries armed with hydrogen bombs it is absolutely essential 
that we explain how a Prisoner’s Dilemma that might well end up being played only once is 
successfully surmounted, in the sense that neither party defects. To do so one must account for why 
players are prepared to choose a strategy which in theoretical terms is strictly dominated. Any realistic 
study of human behavior, whether at the individual, small group, or country level, must begin with the 
acknowledgment that humans possess some behavioral predispositions that cannot be defended as the 
rational behavior of a self-regarding agent. 
If one or both parties defects in the real time Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is no point discussing the 
logic of deterrence: there is simply no arena for it. Once one enters a state in which a fragile peace is 
sustained through mutual (and non-rational) restraint on first strike, successful deterrence requires 
persuading an adversary that you have the intention, under certain states of the world, to behave in  
a manner that could not at that point be defended as rational. The behavior, and the propensity of 
humans to indulge in it, is captured well in experiments involving the ultimatum game [54]. 
The world Schelling (and we) inhabit is a shadowy place where what appears intuitively to make 
perfect sense cannot in fact be defended as the behavior of a rational agent, where we can talk 
                                                 
61 Robert Aumann’s contribution to their analysis was a major theme in the announcement of his Nobel Prize. Aumann 
shared the award with Schelling in 2005. 
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seriously, if not coherently or consistently, about why it may be advantageous to appear to be 
irrational. It is a world of conundrums and distorted mirrors, in which we are likely to be startled by 
our own reflection. 
No gas was used by combatants during the Second World War, and to a remarkable degree, the 
Geneva accords on the treatment of POWs were adhered to by combatants, even though the U.S. never 
signed these conventions. No nuclear weapons were used in the Korean War, and the U.S. did not 
bomb across the Yalu river. The Chinese/North Koreans did not bomb bases in Japan, American ships 
at sea, or bases in Japan (Schelling, [43], pp. 129–130), and Chinese bombers never departed directly 
from China, always effecting a wheels down in North Korea before pursuing their targets (Schelling, [2]). 
Thus, the fury on the battlefield notwithstanding, even war has historically been fought with restraint, 
albeit with different amounts of it in different conflicts. 
But these restraints, and others like them, always chafe. And within elements of countries such as 
the United States, there remained and remains a chafing, a chafing at the constraints apparently 
imposed by a defensive, deterrence based policy, a chafing at the constrains imposed by international 
diplomacy as symbolized by the United Nations and the various “threats” of world government,  
a bugaboo that Robert Welch of the John Birch Society railed against. With the breakup of the Soviet 
Empire and the end of the Cold War, and with the victory of President Bush in the 2000 election, and 
finally with the unprovoked attack on United States soil on 11 September 2001, voices calling for 
aggressive preemption were once again front and center, as they had been periodically in the past  
In foreign policy, it is true that Iraq was an obsession, but the larger agenda was to redefine our 
strategic posture. 
The Pentagon was to become part of a department of Offense as much as Defense, and the one 
percent doctrine advanced by Vice President Cheney gave the United States extraordinary scope for 
launching military action where and when it saw fit. Restraint on first strike was to be drastically 
attenuated: attacks according to this doctrine could be justified by the merest threat (“one percent 
probability”) of possible attacks on the United States, a threat that would be evaluated and defined by 
the United States. And along with the attacks on the presumption against the launch of offensive war 
came attacks on the quaintness of the Geneva conventions, opening the way to the use of interrogation 
techniques the U.S. had branded as torture in war crime prosecutions after the Second World War. 
As a practical matter the country moved in directions periodically advocated by people like James 
Burnham, Curtis Lemay, Herman Kahn, John von Neumann, and Barry Goldwater. Science fiction 
writers and Hollywood screenwriters had fantasized about worlds in which individuals would be 
incarcerated before they committed crimes, simply because statistical methods predicted a high 
probability that they would commit offenses. The one percent doctrine represented the application of 
the principles reflected in the 2002 movie Minority Report to countries. As Suskind put it, “Where 
once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for  
a U.S. military response, now even proof of a threat is too constraining a standard” [47, p. 214]. 
Although the influence of preempters receded with the evidence of the lack of WMDs in Iraq and the 
election of Barack Obama, von Neumann’s heirs will surely regain their seat at the policy making table 
again in the future. 
Schelling’s work on deterrence was premised on the assumption that the United States would not 
itself launch offensive war: that our task rather was to create conditions where we could safeguard our 
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security in a world in which others might. A world of deterrence and containment lacks the simplicity, 
clarity and dreadful beauty of the Nash equilibrium in the Prisoner’s dilemma. It is a messy world, 
cluttered with paradoxes, in which arguments can be made on almost all sides of any policy 
recommendation. But it is the world we must live in if we are to avoid Armageddon. Schelling’s work 
was not about “thinking the unthinkable” to borrow title words from Herman Kahn’s 1962 book.  
It was, in part, about avoiding the unthinkable. And to avoid the unthinkable we must have a sound, 
empirically based picture of the human ethogram, one which acknowledges the sometimes conflicting 
behavioral predispositions with which we are endowed. People emphasize that we live today in a 
world of WMDs against which there are only limited defenses. The challenges today are different than 
they were in the Cold War, but they are not entirely novel. In spite of the hundreds of billions of 
dollars spent on defense the nation stood completely defenseless against an attack of Soviet ICBMs 
until the end of the Cold War. 
The reality is that in some of the most consequential types of human interaction, formal game 
theory has not been useful for understanding how people behave, or how they necessarily should 
behave. Where it is clearly wrong in its predictions, it can, however, serve a useful purpose in helping 
us break out of the box in which much of modern social science has imprisoned behavioral science. Its 
usefulness in this fashion becomes apparent when it makes clear, unambiguous predictions which are 
not borne out by data. In a number of important instances, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma played once 
(a game commonly dismissed as “uninteresting” or “too restrictive” by game theorists), its predictions 
are abundantly contradicted by experimental and observational evidence. But this reality can have less 
impact than perhaps it should, because some theorists simply aren’t interested in using the theory as  
a tool for understanding human behavior (Rubinstein, [37]). Deep down, many theorists wish to 
develop it as a logically consistent and internally coherent set of analyses unconstrained by a 
requirement that its predictions actually map onto human behavior. Such a posture is not reconcilable 
with a serious commitment to an empirically based social or behavioral science. 
Because of its abstruse, esoteric quality and apparent rigor, many, including economic journalists, 
continue to be attracted and intrigued by game theory and, more generally rational choice models, 
without fully appreciating their limitations. Over his long career Schelling did little to discourage those 
who saw him as a “pioneering strategist” making game theory “serve everyday economics”. But the 
substance of his work has been premised on acknowledgements of a more complex human ethogram 
than game theory has been able to accommodate. 
If we combine the assertions that deterrence often does work with the argument that it presupposes 
a commingling of rational and irrational logic and thought processes, then we are forced to question 
the dominant behavioral theory and motivational assumptions which are thought to underpin realist 
foreign policy. There are certain conclusions in modern social science which, although indisputably 
correct, are considered bad form to bring up. A prime example is the absence of an instrumental 
political rationale for voting in national elections. A second is the inability to defend or explain 
deterrence when agents are rational and self-regarding. Deterrence works because we are human,  
not because we are entirely rational. Both of these conclusions point to the limitations of game 
theoretic approaches. Schelling understood these limitations (even if he did not advertise them) and so 
should we. 
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